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THE EVOLUTION OF STADAN 
PREFACE 
Most of the popular interest in space technology focuses on satellites in or- 
bit, probes to the Moon and the planets, and the impressive launch vehicles that 
send these spacecraft on their way. The vital role of satellite tracking and data 
acquisition, without which any space mission would be doomed to failure, has re- 
ceived little recognition and documentation in the literature. To partially re- 
dress this inequity and to relate the historical evolution of NASA's scientific 
satellite tracking facilities - so essential to the success of space science - 
this historical monograph has been prepared. 
In this effort many people generously contributed their time for personal 
interviews, for reviews of the rough draft, and for the ferreting out of support- 
ing information. Special thanks a re  due the following individuals: at NASA 
Headquarters, Frank Anderson, H. R. Brockett, Edmond Buckley, Norman 
Draper, Eugene Emme, Richard Heckel, Milton Rosen, Richard Stock, and Ro- 
land Theisen; at Goddard Space Flight Center, Harold Hoff, George Kronmiller, 
John Mengel, William Mitchell, and Clarence Schroeder; at Marshall Space 
Flight Center, David Akens; at the National Aeronautics and Space Council, Capt. 
Winifred Berg; at General Dynamics, James Crooks; at the Smithsonian Institu- 
tion, Frederick Durant, III; at the Naval Research Laboratory, Roger Easton; 
at Electro-optical Systems, Henry Richter; and Ralph Burhans. 
While every effort has been made to present the many facets surrounding 
this program as accurately as possible, the very effort has created awareness 
of the likelihood of error.  Corrections and additions to this monograph are  in- 
vited. 
October 1, 1966 W. R. C. 
iii 
TABLE O F  CONTENTS 
Section Page 
I. INTRODUCTION. ............................................ 1 
II. PRE-IGY TRACKING DEVELOPMENTS.. ..................... 5 
m. MINITRACK THROUGH THE IGY. ............................ 17 
IV. FOUR YEARS OF STABILITY, 1958-1962 ..................... 33 
V. METAMORPHOSIS O F  MINITRACK INTO STADAN ............. 39 
VI. HISTORICAL SUMMARY ..................................... 51 
BIBLIOGRAPHY.. ........................................... 55 
Appendices 
A. DESCRIPTIVE VIGNETTES OF MINITRACK AND 
STADAN STATIONS ......................................... 57 
B. HISTORY O F  MAJOR EQUIPMENT CHANGES A T  
STADAN STATIONS ......................................... 67 
C. STADAN FINANCIAL SUMMARY, F Y  1956 THROUGH 1967 . .  ... 68 
INDEX ........................................ 69 
iv 
2% 
Fig. 1. Map of 5' 
* Minitrack sites 
5 Ronge-and-range- 
rate equipment 




East Grand Forks, Minn. (phosed out) 
Fort Myers, Fla. 
Blossom Point, Md., (phased out) 
St. Johns. Newfoundland 
Quito, Ecuador 
Lima, Peru 
Antofagasta, Chile, (phosed out) 
Santiago, Chile 
W i  nkfi eld. Enol and 
Johannesburg; South Africa 
Woomera, Australia 
Tan an arive, Malagasy Republ i c 
Orroral Valley, Australia 




Roman, N. C. 
Santiago, Chile 
Tananarive, Malagasy Republic 
Carnarvon, Austral i o  
Quito, Ecuador 
Santiago, Chile 
Johannesburg, South Africa 
Alaska 
Tananarive, Malagasy Republic 









THE EVOLUTION OF STADAN 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Most satellites a r e  information gatherers. Some radio back to Earth meas- 
urements of the Earth's magnetic field; others transmit TV images of the cloud 
cover below. The success of such operations depends, first, upon a communica- 
tion link from satellite to Earth and, second, upon some means of fixing the 
satellite's position when it makes its measurements. These two functions, - data 
acquisition and tracking, are intrinsic to STADAN and form the basis for the 
acronym itself: STADAN = Space Tracking and Data Acquisition Network. NASA's 
STADAN performs two other major functions not blessed by the acronym: satel- 
lite command, wherein instructions a re  radioed to the satellite from the Earth; 
and terrestrial  communication, in which satellite data gathered from all over 
the world a re  funnelled into a central data-processing center. By definition, 
STADAN stops where data processing begins. STADAN, therefore, is a world- 
wide complex of tracking equipment, data-receiving antennas, command anten- 
nas, all the electronic gear associated with these functions, and the terrestrial  
communication links that tie all facilities to the nerve center at Goddard Space 
Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland. (Figure 1) Under the overall direction of 
the Associate Administrator for Tracking and Data Acquisition, NASA Head- 
quarters, Goddard has the operating responsibility for STADAN. 
The records that arrive at Goddard carry not only data from the satellites' 
instruments and attitude sensors but also tracking information acquired by the 
ground station making the telemetry recording. It is of crucial importance that 
orbital position and satellite attitude be added to each record made by a satellite 
scientific instrument; because, if the scientist conducting the experiment does 
not know where the satellite is and which way his instrument is pointing, he 
cannot- properly interpret his data. Worldwide STADAN is essential to the suc- 
cess of weather satellites! geodetic satellites, solar observatories, and the 
many other diverse instrument carriers orbited by NASA. 
STADAN is not used for all spacecraft. NASA also operates the Deep Space 
Network (DSN) that tracks deep-space probes, such as  the Mariners, and the 
Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN) that is used on the Gemini and Apollo pro- 
grams. The boundaries o r  "interfaces" between the three NASA networks a re  
not f i rm.  STADAN is sometimes pressed into service on manned space flights; 
and sometimes the MSFN and DSN antennas follow the scientific and applications 
satellites that are STADAN'S main reason for being. 
1 
Similar interfaces exist between STADAN, the f arflung tracking networks 
maintained by the Department of Defense for military satellites, and the facilities 
of France, Italy, and ESRO (European Space Research Organization). There is 
cmstzmt intercba2ge infermztion between 211 nztxorka on scientific pmj ects .l 
One final point remains in connection with other satellite electronic tracking 
networks; particularly SPASUR, ESTRAC, and DIANE; most networks have 
adopted radio interferometry for satellite tracking, a technique pioneered, in 
the face of substantial opposition, by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) 
during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) on Project Vanguard. STADAN 
itself has evolved directly from the NRL Minitrack network as new stations and 
equipment have been added to  the basic core of IGY Minitrack stations. 
Another interface must be defined - the boundary between STADAN and the 
Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (SAO) network of satellite-tracking 
Baker-Nunn cameras. This network is financially supported by NASA, but it is 
not part of STADAN. The next chapter will discuss the fascinating confrontation 
between optical and electronic tracking prior to the IGY. 
With the functions of STADAN established and its interfaces with other satel- 
lite networks summarized in Figure 2, what is the best way t o  organize an ex- 
pedition into the past to dig out it’s history? Unlike the vicissitude-ridden story 
of America’s satellite effort 2,  STADAN’S history is a rather orderly, cause-and- 
effect tale that logically breaks down into four phases: 
1. Pre-IGY tracking developments 
2. The IGY phase; from proposals to satellites in orbit, 1955-58 
3. Minitrack exploitation, 1958-1962 
4. Minitrack evolves into STADAN, 1960-1966 
Obviously the temporal boundaries between these phases are not hard and fast, 
nor did Minitrack metamorphize into STADAN one fine day. The phases overlap. 
A key feature of Minitrack and STADAN development has been the anticipation of 
satellite requirements - by several years in Some instances - and the construction 
For descriptions of SPASUR, ESTRAC, DIANE, and the other acronym-bearing satell ite networks 
that exist,  see William R. Corliss, Satellite Science and Technology (NASA SP-133). Washing- 
ton: NASA, 1967. 








of equipment and deployment of stations to handle new satellites from the day 
they a re  launched. Jus t  as obviously, STADAN cannot be static today. Tomor- 
row will bring new tracking techniques and new satellite programs will call for  
iiew siaitioiis iii fax%-cjff places. At the moment, however, STADAN has reached 
a temporary plateau of development which is adequate for the present state of 
America's scientific and application satellite programs. Thus we have a propi- 
tious period of relative quiet in which to look back and see how STADAN became 
what it is today. 
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CHAPTER II 
PRE - IGY TRACKING DEVELOPMENTS 
STADAN has four functions: tracking, data acquisition, command, and com- 
munication; each of which has a historical trail leading back many decades, even 
into the Nineteenth Century. Data acquisition via a radio link goes back at least 
to 1925, when the Russian scientist Pyotr A. Moltchanoff received telemetry 
signals from instruments he had installed on a balloon launched in Siberia. The 
function of remote command, where unmanned machines a re  controlled by radio 
signals, goes back to the 1920s, when many tinkerers built remote-control boats 
and aircraft. The concept of a network of geographically dispersed information- 
acquiring stations linked to a central processing facility by communication lines 
undoubtedly goes back millenia to the times when military outposts sent runners 
and chariots back to headquarters. Weather stations and astronomical observa- 
tories have had centralized data-collecting facilities for centuries. Fascinating 
as the histories of such activities may be, it is the tracking function that leads 
us  directly to the early Minitrack network, the core of NASA’s STADAN. Even 
more specifically, radio interferometer tracking has done the most to shape the 
present STADAN network, although optical tracking and, to a lesser extent, 
Doppler tracking, have all contributed. 
Antiquity of Optical Tracking 
Tracking means measuring the position of a moving object. Today astrono- 
mers  track the stars with telescopes driven by clock-controlled motors, Before 
such refinements, Tycho Brahe, in the 16th century, Ptolemy, in the 2nd, and 
their predecessors in earlier centuries had manually followed the stars and 
planets with astrolabes and other sighting devices. The point is that optical 
tracking is a venerable, well-proven part  of our technical repertoire. When 
faced with the problem of tracking an artificial celestial object, it was logical 
to think first of optical techniques. This is precisely what happened with the 
artificial s atellite. 
As a matter of fact, the first aiiusion ~CO the up i i cd  irackiiig iif iiIa-ii:ade 
satellites came the fictional route, in 1870, when Edward Everett Hale published 
his precocious tale “The Brick Moon” in the Atlantic Monthly. Hale envisaged 
flinging a large, inert mass into orbit along the Greenwich meridian with a large, 
water-powered flywheel. The satellite would be visible to mariners through 
their sextants, making the computation of their ship’s longitude easier. In truth, 
of course, Hale was suggesting terrestrial navigation via optical observations of 
a man-made satellite in a known orbit rather than the reverse problem of tracking 
3The story is also available in a collection of Hale’s works, The Brick Moon & Other Stories, 
Boston: Little, Brown, 1899. Hale also wrote the better-known “The Man Without a Country.” 
5 
a known satellite of unknown position from ground stations whose locations are 
precisely known. The idea of visually following a satellite made visible by 
sunlight was a key concept, however. 
Optical tracking of the V-2 and early U.S. missiles at White Sands during the 
late 1940's and early 1950's seemed to confirm the value of optics in this em- 
bryonic space work. Most intriguing, though, is the blank spot that existed in 
the plans of the early satellite thinkers during the same period. Although V-2'S, 
Vikings, and other rockets were being regularly tracked, no one seems to have 
been concerned about tracking the satellites which were constantly in the backs 
of the minds of these missile pioneers. No one seemed to have thought much about 
how to confirm that a satellite was actually in orbit or how to measure the orbital 
elements once the satellite was discovered. This myopia probably had its roots 
in the fact that the satellite pioneers were missile and rocket men, not astrono- 
mers. Their thoughts gravitated to  the brute-force construction of a successful 
launch vehicle instead of the delicate problem of finding and tracking the few 
pounds of payload it carried. 
The first serious U.S. satellite study confirms this statement through omis- 
sion - the omission of any mention of satellite tracking at all. The study re-  
ferred to is  the landmark report: Preliminary Design of an Experimental World- 
Circling Spaceship, written by the Rand Corporation, then a part of Douglas Air-  
craft Co., and published on May 2, 1946, as Douglas Report SM-11827. The only 
STADAN function mentioned in the report was that of data acquisition; a set of 
equatorial telemetry-receiving stations was proposed. Naturally the report was 
written mainly by rocket and aircraft engineers who had never really had the 
problem of locating a small object lost in the immensity of space. The signifi- 
cance of this blindspot became obvious nine years later when various satellite 
proposals were being evaluated for the U.S. IGY effort. 
The first clear statement of the tracking problem came, as we should expect, 
from an astronomer. In an article, "The Heavens Open," in Colliers, in 1952, 
Dr. Fred L. Whipple of Harvard said: 
Predicting the position and motion of the space station itself will 
be one of the most difficult problems ever encountered in celestial 
mechanics, or  the science of predicting the positions of astronomical 
objects. 
Whipple went on to  become the major proponent of optical satellite tracking 
during the IGY days and was one of the few recognized scientists who helped 
"sell'' the IGY satellite idea to the rather reluctant political and scientific 
communities. 
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Radio Tracking. is of Recent Vintage 
To recapitulate developments in electronic tracking and bring its history up 
to the confrontation with optical tracking in the middle 1950s, there is no need to 
reach back to the ancient civilizations. Hertz did not discover radio waves until 
1888, and Marconi's experiments did not begin until the 1890s. Radio tracking of 
moving, astronomical signal sources began when a Bell Laboratories engineer, 
K a r l  Janksy, discovered and followed celestial radio noise sources across the 
sky with directional antennas in 1932.4 Grote Reber followed up Janksy's work, 
building the first paraboloidal radiotelescope in his backyard in 1937. Reber 
was preceded by developments in radar, which employs artificial "illumination" 
of the target. Sir Robert Watson-Watt was tracking aircraft in Great Britain with 
primitive radar as early as 1935. Radio echoes had been noted decades earlier. 
By the time Grote Reber had finished making his backyard radio dish, there 
were four electronic tracking schemes in being that had some potential for 
tracking satellites: 
Radar, which required no signal source on the satellite. 
Dish tracking, a 16 Reber, which necessitated a satellite-borne trans- 
mitter. 
Triangulation using radio-direction finders, which also required a 
signal source on the satellite. 
Doppler analysis of the radio signals received from a moving source. 
This technique was recognized in 1937, but its value in tracking was 
not appreciated. 
Still a fifth technique was potentially available - that of radio interferometry. 
The basic idea here was the use of two receiving points, as shown in Figure 3, 
and the comparison of the phases of the signals received separately by each. 
Michelson's first attempt to detect the motion of the postulated ether past the 
Earth in 1881. The first use of radio guidance (not tracking) seems to have been 
by German engineers at Peenemlinde.' Here, VHF transmitters laid down a lobed 
Z ? h > r ~ i ~ i ~ t ~  h a ~ e  !=E$ used ~pt ica!  i ~ t e f i e r ~ ~ ~ & e r s  i i ~  cxperiiiieiits, S U C ~  8s ~ i r ~ e r i  A -1 
4Before this time radio direction finding w a s  used by ships and aircraft a s  a navigation aid. 
During World War I ,  the American engineer Edwin H. Armstrong developed a radio-detection 
system that picked up and tracked the ignition noise of approaching aircraft. 
'Personal communication from James W. Crooks, Jr., July 28, 1966. 
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TO SATELLITE TO SATELLITE 
n h  = BASELINE IN WAVE LENGTHS 
A = TOTAL PHASE DIFFERENCE IN WAVE LENGTHS 
4 =ANGLE FROM BASELINE TO SATELLITE IN PLANE DEFINED BY 
BASIC INTERFEROMETER EQUATION: COS cb = A/nX 
ANTENNA X, ANTENNA Y ,  AND SATELLITE ANTENNA 
Figure 3. The interferometer principle. The quantity A is  measured electronically 
by phase comparison; then, the interferometer equation i s  used to find 4- 
8 
antenna pattern to improve azimuth guidance during a few V-2 flight tests in the 
early 1940s. The technique, however was not employed during operational use 
of the weapons; it bears only a superficial resemblance to later satellite-tracking 
interferometers. 
In radio interferometry, we get on the main track leading directly to Van- 
guard, Minitrack, and ultimately STADAN. Of course, no one knew this in 1940, 
or even 15 years later. Our hindsight, however, permits concentration on this 
tracking scheme in preference to the other electronic and optical techniques. It 
is a matter of conjecture whether radio interferometry would actually have been 
chosen for tracking the Vanguard satellite had all available tracking possibilities 
been systematically evaluated and compared when the Vanguard program began 
in 1955. Like many technical ideas that see hardware form, the path to success 
was not clearly logical; rather, the decision was a complex function of person- 
alities, timing, past experience , and nontechnical considerations. 
The Crucial Viking Work 
In the U.S. missile effort the path to Minitrack and STADAN becomes wide 
and straight. Radio interferometry has the advantage of yielding very accurate 
tracking angles when the target cooperates by emitting a radio signal. The 
angular precision of interferometry led to the development of the Azusa tracking 
system as  part of the Army Ai r  Corps NUL-774 Project, forerunner of the Atlas 
ICBM program, at the Vultee Field Division of Consolidated Vultee Aircraft 
Corporation in Downey, California.6 Two of the basic patents (2,972,047 and 
3,025,520) in the field of interferometer tracking are  shared by James Crooks, 
Jr., Robert C. Weaver, and Robert V. Werner, all members of the Azusa design 
team. By the spring of 1948, the Azusa team had built an interferometer oper- 
ating at 148.58 M c . ~  In a strange circle of history, the U.S. Naval Research 
Laboratory (NRL) was working on underwater sound interferometers at the time 
Convair was developing Azusa. Since the two groups were in close contact, there 
was considerable interchange of ideas.* The circle was completed in the early 
1950s when the Navy picked up the Azusa interferometer work for its Viking 
project at White Sands, New Mexico. The Navy wanted to expiore the possibility 
6Personal communication from James W. Crooks, Jr., July 28, 1966. The f i r s t  formal report 
uncovered bears the title “A Precision Missile Tracking System,” by James W. Crooks, Jr., 
Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. (Convair) Report DEVF 4038, December 1946. Army 
Contract W33038-AC-14168. 
Robert C. Weaver, “Phase Comparison Angle Tracking System,” Convair Report ZN-6002-0 17, 
March 2, 1948. 
‘Interview with Milton Rosen, May 18, 1966. 
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of converting the Viking or  some derivative of it into a guided missile and it 
needed an accurate guidance system. In an early report from this programg, 
NRL's J. Carl Seddon explained how the Viking would determine its position: 
"The Missile will detect its position relative to  the hyperbolic guidance path by 
phase comparison of modulation waveforms derived from signals received from 
two pairs of stations." In this scheme, the missile would guide itself using onboard 
electronics and navigational signals received from the ground. This seems a far 
cry from Minitrack and satellite tracking, but phase comparison, the essence of 
Minitrack, is there. Within a year, NRL reports from the Viking program were 
diagramming ground-based, tracking interferometers, which relieved the Viking 
of the burden of signal-processing equipment by computing the missile's position 
from the ground. lo Two precursors of Minitrack a re  evident in the interferom- 
eter arrangement shown in Figure 4. First ,  only a tiny radio beacon needs to be 
carried on the Viking itself. This was to be an important feature of the Vanguard 
"Minitrack," in which the prefix f'Mini" applies to the minimum-weight satellite 
transmitter. The second precursor is the "Lff arrangement of the interferometer 
antennas which persisted in some early designs of Minitrack, although the final 
deployed version extended the bars of the "L" to make a cross.  
Pressures for  a Satellite Program 
While NRL was flying and tracking Vikings at White Sands, pressure for a 
national satellite program was building up. Scientific instruments carried on 
captured V-2s,  Aerobees, and Vikings and whetted the appetite of the scientific 
community for a long-lived instrument platform above the atmosphere, where 
space phenomena could be measured directly over long periods of time. In 1952, 
V-2 experimenters such as James A. Van Allen pushed for a strong upper at- 
mosphere rocket program. In 1954, the Ad Hoc Committee on Space Flight of the 
American Rocket Society (ARS) proposed to the National Science Foundation that 
the United States sponsor the construction of a small satellite to be launched by 
military rockets during the IGY. l 1  In the f a l l  of 1954, the U.S. Committee f o r  
the IGY formed a small study group, with Fred Whipple as chairman, to  study 
the idea of a U.S. IGY satellite. Whipple's group reported on a l'Long-Playing 
Rocket," or LPR, that would orbit a 5-kg white sphere that could be tracked 
optically from the Earth. Whipple's zeal and salesmanship undoubtedly did much 
to sell the satellite idea to the U.S. government. H i s  astonomer's predilection 
for  optical tracking, however, was evident. 
'Milton W. Rosen, and J .  Carl Seddon, "Rocket Research Report No. VI" Conversion of Viking 
into a Guided Missile." NRL Report No. 3829, April 1, 1951. (In NASA Historical Archives.) 
Both authors are now with NASA. 
lo John T. Mengel, and K.  M. Uglow, Rocket Research Report No. XI, "A Phase-Comparison 
Guidance System for Viking," NRL Report 3982, May 5, 1952. John T. Mengel i s  now Assistant 
Director of the Office of Tracking & Data Systems, Goddard Space Flight Center, NASA. 
"This ARS Committee was chaired by Milton Rosen, from the Naval Research Laboratory, who 
later helped put the Vanguard proposal together. For further details of the ARS recommendation 
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Figure 4. Viking White Sands radio interferometer proposed in NRL Report 3982, dated May 5, 
1952. The L-shape antenna layout and Doppler features were part of the original Vanguard Pro- 
posal in 1955. 
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Whipple was also closely associated with "Project Orbiter," which was 
aimed at establishing the engineering feasibility of an Earth satellite. Project 
Orbiter pooled the talents of the Office of Naval Research, l2 the Army Ballistic 
Missile Agency (von Braun's group), the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) of the 
California Institute of Technology, and several industrial concerns. Commander 
George Hoover of the Office of Naval Research headed the Orbiter program. The 
plan of Orbiter was  simple and straightforward: take one of von Braun's mili- 
tary rocket boosters, perhaps a modification of the Redstone, add solid-rocket 
upper stages built and proved by JPL,  and propel a small satellite into orbit. l3 
The concept was feasible and would represent a technical first for the United 
States. Tracking would be accomplished optically, but at this time this seemed 
secondary to getting something into orbit. l4 
study independent of Orbiter during 1954 and early 1955. l5 The NRL feasibility 
study concluded that an Aerobee solid rocket, plus a small solid third stage, on 
top of a Viking first stage could put a small payload into orbit. Satellite tracking 
was not considered in this propulsion study. 
NRL was also interested in the idea of an Earth satellite and conducted a 
By the summer of 1955, the stage was set for concrete action on a U.S. satel- 
lite program. The ingredients forcing such a decision were: 
0 The coming IGY and the manifest desirability of a small scientific 
satellite. 
0 The existence of a rocket technology capable of launching a small 
satellite. 
The cold-war pressure to produce a spectacular technical accomplish- 
ment. 
Consequently, on July 29, 1955, President Eisenhower announced that the United 
States would launch "small, m a n n e d  earth-circling satellites as a part of the 
U.S. participation in the IGY." The Department of Defense was to be the launch- 
ing agency. 
0 
12The  Naval Research Laboratory, which was  to make the Vanguard proposal in  1 9 5 5 ,  was 
administratively attached to the Office of Naval Research,  but was  a much older organization 
with a long history of recognized scient i f ic  and engineering excel lence.  NRL remained rather 
aloof during the Orbiter study. 
13V0n Braun frequently proposed such a combination of rockets  for satellite launching. See: "A 
Minimum Satellite Vehicle," Redstone Arsenal Report, dated 15 September 1954.  
141t i s  interesting to note that at the time of Orbiter J P L  engineers  such  as Henry Richter, 
Eberhardt Rechtin, William Sampson, and others  were working on phase-locked electronic 
tracking systems, the forerunners of the Microlock Doppler-interferometer system. 
See p. 437.  
"John P. Hagen, "The Viking and the Vanguard," Technology and Culture,  I'J ( F a l l  1 9 6 3 A  4 3 5 .  
1 2  
J 
By the time of the President's announcement, three major satellite proposals 
were on hand: the Orbiter proposal, using optical tracking; an NRL proposal, 
using an electronic tracking scheme derived from its White Sands work; and a 
proposal based on the highly classified and very high priority Atlas program. 
To select the most appropriate program, a Committee on Special Capabilities, 
chaired by Homer J. Stewart, was convened by the Department of Defense. The 
arguments were hot and heavy; each proposal team was emotionally involved in 
its ideas. The Committee's final decision was far from unanimous, but the NRL 
proposal was recommended for several reasons : 
0 NRL emphasized the scientific aspects of the program. 
0 The proposed launch vehicle did not entail the use of military rockets, 
a fact that made the program more palatable from the standpoint of 
international relations and the IGY program. Furthermore, no U.S. 
military rocket program would be compromised. 
0 NRL had proposed a good tracking scheme that showed up some de- 
ficiencies in the Orbiter proposal. 
Since electronic tracking was an important, though perhaps not deciding, 
factor in the decision to  adopt the NRL proposal, we should review briefly those 
few months in the spring of 1955 at NRL that led up to the successful proposal 
and the beginning of Vanguard. 
Genesis of the NRL Vanguard ProDosal 
With s o  many years of experience with V-2s and Vikings at White Sands be- 
hind them, the NRL Rocket Development Branch, under Milton Rosen, could 
hardly be indifferent to all the talk of artificial scientific satellites making the 
rounds in early 1955. Rosen, as mentioned earlier, was Chairman of the ARS 
committee that made satellite recommendations to  the National Science Founda- 
tion. Furthermore NRL had refined the White Sands tracking interferometers 
described eariier. ~n early Aprii iY55, iviiiton Rosen, John Mengei, and Iioger 
Easton assembled informally at NRL and generated a document entitled, "Pro- 
posal for  Minimum Trackable Satellite (Minitrack)." No date and no authors 
are listed on this key report; but, according to Rosen, it preceded only by a few 
days a more formal report with the title, "A Scientific Satellite Program,'' dated 
April 13, 1955, and written by the NRL Rocket Development Branch. Appendix 
B of this document was labeled, "The Minitrack System'' and was nearly identical 
to  its predecessor of a few days. The name "Minitrack," now appearing for the 
first time on paper, was coined by John Mengel. The radio interferometer con- 
cept advanced in these two reports differed only in the wavelength used from an 
13 
X-band (1000-Mc) interferometer developed by NRL for submarine-based track- 
ing of Viking test vehicles in pre-Polaris research. (Figure 5) The antenna 
geometry and supporting electronics were essentially identical. 
July 5, 1955. In content, it differed by little from the earlier informal documents.16 
The f n r m l l  NRL p m p c d  set befere the Stewart Cemmittee bears the date 
Why did NRL emphasize Minitrack in its proposal? Optical tracking was 
the way to go, according to  many experts. Fred Whipple, who had made many 
significant camera observations of meteorites entering the Earth's atmosphere, 
had proved that a small payload of a few kilograms could be seen with terrestrial 
optical instruments. Rosen, at NRL, had doubts; and he asked Richard Tousey 
at NRL to check through the calculations in the spring of 1955. Tousey confirmed 
the visibility computations, but believed that there would only be a "million-in- 
one chance" of finding the satellite with optical equipment, given the uncertain- 
ties of a rocket launch, variable weather conditions, and the fact that the satellite 
would be visible only at dusk and dawn. This factor - satellite acquisition - 
was the practical fact of life that made electronic tracking desirable. What good 
was the precision of optical equipment if it could not find the satellite in the 
first place ? 
the inclusion of electronic tracking in the NRL satellite proposal. John Mengel 
and Roger Easton showed, in the NRL reports mentioned above, that electronic 
interferometer tracking using a tiny satellite-borne transmitter was quite 
feasible, based upon White Sands experience. l7 
Tousey had found a weak spot in the Orbiter proposal, and Roscn pushed for  
The NRL tracking scheme met with disdain and disbelief in optical quarters. 
Von Braun, however, was  apparently taken aback by this hole in the Orbiter argu- 
ment. He stated his willingness to include a Minitrack beacon on Orbiter."Never- 
theless Minitrack emerged as a definite plus sign in favor of the NRL proposal. 
16The full reference for the NRL proposal is: "A Scientific Satellite Program," NRL Memo 487, 
July 5, 1955, with addendum let ters  S-7140-26255, Aug. 23, 1955, and C-711-14355, Sept. 3, 
1955. 
Green. 
A f u l l  history of Project Vanguard is now being prepared for NASA by Mrs. Constance M. 
17We would expect NRL to adopt the system of electronic tracking m o s t  familiar to them, but 
radar and Doppler tracking were also examined. Radar w a s  also plagued by the acquisitioll 
problem - you had to know where to look. Doppler tracking, as we s h a l l  s e e  in the next 
chapter, was actually implicit in the f i rs t  Minitrack proposal. NRL also looked at ar t i f ic ia l  
sa te l l i t e  illumination using searchlight;  but, again, one had to know where to point the search- 
lights. In a modern version of th i s  pinpointing idea,  l a s e r s  bounce l ight off sa te l l i t es  in known 
orbits to improve the precision of the orbital elements. 




Project Vanguard began at NRL on Sept. 9 ,  1955, when the Secretary of the 
Navy was authorized by the Department of Defense to  proceed with the NRL 
proposal. Electronic tracking was firmly established in the NRL Minitrack con- 
cept. 
History, always retrospective, often makes things look too easy. Actually, 
because of Orbiter's momentum, the NRL proposal team believed that they stood 
little chance of winning the U.S. satellite program. According to John Mengel, 
the surprise announcement came as the NRL tracking team was checking out the 
second and last X-band interferometer. The interferometer was quickly put in 
moth balls and work began on Minitrack, with its ten-times-longer wavelength 




MINITRACK THROUGH THE IGY 
When the Naval Research Laboratory was assigned the U.S. satellite pro- 
gram by the Secretary of the Navy on Sept. 9, 1955, one would expect that Mini- 
track would also become the "official" satellite tracking system. It is true that 
the Minitrack idea was turned into hardware and deployed in the first worldwide 
electronic tracking net during the IGY; but this chapter must also deal with pro- 
liferations of the Minitrack concept as well  as those competing tracking schemes 
that were spawned during the pre-Vanguard days and refused to die. 
Perhaps it was just as well that Minitrack did not have a clear field; though 
it annoyed NRL personnel, the competition was stimulating. 
This competition came primarily from two sources: 
0 The Orbiter program that lived on close to the surface at ABMA, ONR, 
and JPL. By now, the Orbiter proponents had adopted the J P L  Micro- 
lock electronic tracking concept to counter Minitrack. It was this 
"shadow" Army satellite program, of course, that ultimately launched 
the first U.S. satellite, Explorer I. 
0 The SA0 optical network, which was funded by the National Science 
Foundation as complementary to  Minitrack. Deep in their hearts pro- 
ponents of optics and electronics each knew their system was better 
and would be the "prime" tracking system. 
Two offshoots of Minitrack also deserve a few words: Minitrack 11 (or 
Mark 11 Minitrack), an amateur tracking program; and Active Minitrack, a mili- 
tary space surveillance system. First, though, let us see how the NRL proposal 
ideas of April 1955 were turned into an operational network. 
Development and Deployment of Minitrack 
The Minitrack network that became operational in October 1957 was sub- 
stantially different from that proposed to the Stewart committee in the summer 
of 1955. Here is what NRL originally proposed: 
The complete Minitrack System wil l  consist of two complete phase com- 
parison stations, the second identical t o  the one just described but located 
at a distance of 20 miles on an E-W line to permit determination of satel- 
lite altitude to an accuracy of 0.5 miles, and satellite velocity to an 
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accuracy of better than 100 feet per second. Both of these stations will 
include a second ground station to permit the determination of the satel- 
lite position in a direction normal to its direction of travel, giving a 
u u A A A p l b b b  
.- 
n*mmla+n 9 0-4,. c:-- -- LL - 
 LA UII LIX saieiiite as weii as its velocity. 
In addition to angle-tracking interferometry of White Sands vintage, the quotation 
implies distance (altitude) measurement through triangulation from a pair of 
stations and Doppler velocity measurements. Note that only a single pair of 
stations was anticipated, not a worldwide network. 
Before the end of 1955, ideas changed drastically. First, it was realized 
that a single pair of stations would provide very limited geographical coverage, 
rendering data acquisition difficult and the accumulation of orbital data very 
slow. Four pairs of stations across the southern U.S. were next proposed. The 
idea of an “electronic fence” was implicit in this suggestion i.e., the creation of 
a long chain of overlapping antenna patterns that the satellite must intersect 
frequently. The trouble was that the orbital inclination of the Vanguard satellite 
would keep it away from the southern U.S. too much of the time. The next logi- 
cal step was the construction of a long north-south fence that the satellite would 
pass through on almost every orbit. But the Vanguard program could not 
financially support a long chain of paired stations ; besides, further thought soon 
showed that complete orbital data could be computed from angular (interfero- 
metric) tracking alone. These changes in thinking manifested themselves in a 
report describing a chain of nine single Minitrack stations strewn along the 75th 
meridian. 2o To the regret of some engineers, ranging and velocity-measuring 
capabilities were dropped. 21  
The technical desirability of Minitrack stations on foreign soil was one thing; 
more formidable were site negotiation, site preparation, and logistics. The situ- 
ation was particularly acute in South American countries that were sensitive 
about U.S. bases and where transportation and communication facilities were 
primitive. Unfortunately Minitrack stations required radio-quiet spots which 
a r e  usually not coexistent with the also-desired communication links and supply 
facilities. 2 2  
”“A Scientific Satellite Program,” NRL Memo 487, July 5, 1955. 
20Project Vanguard Report  to Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Development), NRL 
Memo 548, Dec. 12, 1955. The suggested station locations were Washington, Jacksonville, 
Havana, Barbuda, Canal Zone, Quito, Huancayo, Tocopilla, and Santiago. (See Appendix A.) 
21Rather ironically, ranging and Doppler capabilities are now being added to STADAN as the 
Goddard Range and Range Rate equipment is deployed. The logically neat sequence of (1) re- 
quirement definition, (2)  plan definition, and (3)  equipment development was impossible at a 
time when engineers knew little about satell ites and tracking. 
2 2  “Preliminary Specifications and Considerations - Minitrack Site Faci l i t ies ,”  NRL document 
dated Feb- 27, 1956. No author or number. (In NASA Vanguard f i les . )  
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Captain Winifred Berg, the Navy Senior Project Officer assigned to Van- 
guard, had the task of getting Minitrack stations into the South American countries. 
He  was aided by two already-existing organizations: (1) The Inter-American 
Geodetic Survey (IAGS), in which the U.S. Army Map Service was very active, 
and (2) the International IGY committees that existed in most countries. A s  
1956 began, Berg and others realized that time was already growing short. The 
IGY was to end in less than two years, Vanguard was barely started, and the long 
slow process of site selection, negotiation, construction, and station checkout 
was not even begun. Prodding the State Department produced little added speed. 
In early March, Captain Berg informed the Department of State that he was 
leaving on March 23 with a Site Selection Team to negotiate Minitrack sites in 
South America. 23 
Between March 23 and late April, Berg’s team, which included NRL and 
Army personnel, toured South America, locating sites and drawing up the re- 
quisite agreements with the countries concerned. The Army Map Service saw 
to it that the Site Selection Team saw the right people in the political and sci- 
entific spheres. With the convivial feeling engendered by the IGY, with all its 
scientific and non-military features, and the good offices of the Army, the task 
was accomplished in  only five weeks. Back in Washington, Berg informed the 
State Department that all countries concerned had agreed to a joint July 1, 1956, 
release of the news of the IGY tracking sites. Although the State Department 
missed the July 1 target date by several weeks, the formalities were completed 
and Minitrack entered the deployment phase. 
The Site Selection Team had picked six South American locations: Havana, 
Panama, Quito, Lima, Antofagasta, and Santiago; but who would undertake the 
imposing task of setting up stations outside the United States proper? The U.S. 
Army, by virtue of its IAGS experience, was the logical choice; in September 
1956, the Army Chief of Engineers initiated construction at the six sites at the 
request of NRL.24 More specifically, the task fell to  the specially created 
Project Vanguard Task Force of the Army Map Service. It should be mentioned 
hc re  thzt the Secth Am-ericm sites, though near large cities, were generally 
some distance from modern facilities and the associated radio noise. The iso- 
lation and primitive conditions caused logistics and morale problems in the early 
days. 
The Minitrack sites in the continental U.S. were established with greater 
ease. The Navy set up and operated the Blossom Point and San Diego stations; 
23Captain Winifred Berg, personal interview, May 12, 1966. 
24U1timately the Panama site was abandoned (See Appendix A for details). The Army also 
handled construction at the Ft. Stewart site. See: Smitherman, W. D., “Army Participation in 
Project Vanguard,” IRE Trans., MIL-4 (June 1960), 323. 
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the latter being at the Brown Naval Auxiliary A i r  Station, near Chula Vis ta ,  
California, and operated by the Naval Electronics Laboratory. The stations 
downrange from Cape Canaveral were set up in cooperation with Great Britain 
and o=er&x! by the U.S. Navy and A i r  Force. Af te r  deliberation Over tracking 
requirements, logistics, and support facilities, Antigua and Grand Turk were 
finally chosen for down-range stations instead of the initially planned Barbuda 
and Mayaguana. More details about the sites and the factors influencing their 
choice o r  rejection can be found in Appendix A. 
The Blossom Point station, just 40 miles south of Washington, went into 
operation in July 1956, and was soon employed as a training headquarters for  
Minitrack operators and as a test facility for Minitrack equipment. During the 
IGY and after, many foreign nationals took the Minitrack course at Blossom 
Point. In fact, the willingness of NRL and NASA to employ and train foreign 
nationals at the Minitrack and STADAN stations greatly eased the task of placing 
U.S. facilities on foreign soil. Minitrack stations have "earned their keep" 
many times over as non-political, no-strings-attached representatives of the 
United States. 25 
The full Minitrack network of ten stations was placed in operation during 
October 1957, with the eleventh, at Woomera, Australia, added a month later. 
It should already be evident that the Minitrack network was not a static thing. 
Stations were added and subtracted as the space program required. Bigger 
satellites with more transmitter power made stations such as Antofagasta re- 
dundant. Political harassment in Cuba made it apparent as early as September 
1957 the Havana station would probably have to be moved. 26 
Simultaneously with the Minitrack station construction, NRL engineers were 
proving out electronic equipment that would track and communicate with the 
satellite. Frequency selection was an early item on the agenda. The original 
NRL proposal had postulated 100 Mc as the interferometer frequency. A t  this 
frequency, the subminiature circuits needed for the tiny satellite transmitter 
would be reasonably efficient; the interferometer baseline of 100 wavelengths 
would be a practical 1093 ft .  ; and the width of the fence projected up toward 
passing satellites would be adequate. A frequency of 108 Mc was finally agreed 
upon by the countries concerned, on a local basis, but only for  the duration of 
the IGY. Local interference proved a problem at 108 Mc; and Minitrack switched 
to the 136-to-137 Mc range in 1960 when the International Telecommunications 
25Arnold, Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space, Prentice-Hall, Inc. Englewood Cl i f f s ,  New 
Jersey,  1765. 
- 
26NRL Memo 4130-417: JTM: Ids,  Sept. 23, 1757. (In NASA Vanguard f i les . )  See Appendix A 
for details and chronology of station changes. 
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Union (ITU) set aside this band for space research. For  years, however, 108-Mc 
satellites were on the air (especially Vanguard I), and conversion was not com- 
pleted until three years later. 
The Minitrack interferometer antenna layout, which had begun as  a simple 
"L" at White Sands (Figure 4) became a cross, actually two crosses, because 
two separate interferometers with different baselines were needed to resolve an 
ambiguity in satellite direction inherent in a single interferometer. These two 
interferometers were termed "fine" and "coarse. 
antenna layout is shown in Figure 6. It has changed little since first installed 
during 1956 and 1957. 
The classical Minitrack 
I 
Y 
Figure 6. Minitrack antenna field in the foreground; 40-ft paraboloid antenna in the background. 
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In contracting for  Minitrack antenna construction, NRL first asked the D. S. 
Kennedy Company and the Technical Appliance Company to build test hardware 
versions. In one of those strange turnabouts in government contracting, the 
D. S. Kennedy Company cRme 11.p with the hest antepz-2, hfit the T p ~ h p j ~ d  Appli- 
ance Company received the construction contract on a price basis, ultimately 
turning out their competitor's antenna for deployment at the Minitrack sites. 
Another aspect of Minitrack contracting had consequences that persist in 
today's STADAN operation. The Bendix Corporation, at Towson, Md., won the 
contract to build the electronic gear that amplified and analyzed the signals 
picked up by the Technical Appliance Company antennas. A s  their equipment 
was dispersed to the field sites, NRL asked Bendix to  send their men along to 
the South American sites to familiarize the Army and local personnel with the 
equipment. Bendix has subsequently won all open competitions for Minitrack 
electronic equipment and now holds contracts for STADAN flM&O'l (Maintenance 
and Operation). It became hard to find a STADAN station without also finding a 
Bendix engineer. 
In addition to the tracking function, each Minitrack station had to pick up and 
record the satellite's telemetry transmission. The fixed, narrow, wedge-shaped 
interferometer antenna pattern was unsuited to this task. NRL had to design 
some so r t  of antenna that would follow the satellite from horizon to horizon. A 
Blossom Point experiment was carried out in 1956 with Yagi antennas fixed on 
a framework resembling a playground swing. The test emphasized the need for  
following thc satcllitc with a directional antenna. A f'seesawlf or  "rockinghorse" 
antenna evolved. (Figure 7) This consisted of half a Minitrack antenna pivoted 
on a horizontal axle. A s  the satellite passed overhead the antennas were manually 
tilted from one extreme to  the other, just like a seesaw. The primitive "seesaw" 
later gave way to a succession of more refined data-acquisition antennas that 
will be described later. 
It is one thing to have an operating interferometer station and quite another 
to turn the received satellite signal into data that can be digested by a computer 
and rendered as precision orbital elements. First, the centers of the Minitrack 
antenna arrays had to be accurately located on a consistent, interconnected 
system of geodetic coordinates. This was easy within the U.S., and, thanks to 
the Army Map Service work in South America, it was eventually done for  all 
stations within the  Western Hemisphere. A special Vanguard Datum reference 
system came into being. The Woomera site in Australia was another matter, no 
one knew the distances between continents with real precision. One of the impor- 
tant accomplishments of satellites, of course, has been the tying together Of previ- 
ously isolated continental geodetic grids with the help of satellite geodesy; thus, 
WoQmera and other isolated stations were tied into a unified reference system. 
22 
l -  
Figure 7. Photograph of the “rockinghorse” data-acquisition antenna deployed around the Mini- 
track network during the IGY. The antenna portion-the part that “teeters”-is just a section of 
the regular interferometer antenna. (Courtesy of W. Mitchell, GSFC) 
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A second Minitrack operational problem was calibration in terms of known 
signal sources. At first, it was suggested that one of the SA0 Baker-Nunn 
cameras be located at the center of each Minitrack array so that airplane-borne 
radio signal sources could be tracked electronically hy Minitrack andi  a t  the 
same time, against the known background of fixed stars by the Baker-Nunns. 
There were emotional and operational problems that prevented this fusion of 
optical and electronic networks. Although it was proclaimed that Minitrack and 
the Baker-Nunns were complementary, their proponents were yet to  be convinced 
in 1957. There were practical reasons. Neither optical nor electronic satellite 
tracking had yet proved itself, and it would be unwise to make the success of one 
dependent upon the success of the other. Furthermore, the Baker-Nunns needed 
much better seeing conditions than those available at the Minitrack sites, which 
had not been chosen with "seeing" criteria in mind. 
Consequently the Baker-Nunn cameras went to their own sites and small 
27  astrographic calibration cameras were emplaced at the Minitrack stations. 
High-flying aircraft, helicopters, and both free and tethered balloons carrying 
optical and radio signal sources calibrated the Minitrack interferometers. 28 By 
comparing light flashes and star backgrounds from the camera plates with si- 
multaneously received radio signals, the signals from real satellites could be 
more accurately interpreted. This calibration technique, however, did not account 
for the much greater refraction of radio waves in the ionosphere well above the 
calibrating source. 
In addition to their geodetic ties, the Minitrack stations had to  have coordi- 
nated "clockst1 and communication lines back to  the NRL Vanguard Control 
Center in Washington. Basic time referents came from standard frequency 
transmitters, such as station WWV. A Precision Time Standard Rack at each 
station was capable of an accuracy of one millisecond per  day after calibration 
against WWV. The matter of communication was more difficult in remote, un- 
developed areas. Again the Army experience and facilities in South America 
came to the rescue. The Map Service's Project Vanguard Task Force set up the 
rather impressive system of data links diagrammed in Figure 8. Data converged 
on the NRL Vanguard Control Center and was transmitted from there to the 
27An interesting technical aside: The Army had suggested i n  1957 that the Minitrack s i tes  be 
electronically calibrated through the use  of radio signals bounced off the Moon, whose position, 
of course, was known as well a s  the stars. This technique was not employed for calibrations, 
although radio echoes from the Moon were obtained by the Army. 




Vanguard Computing Center in downtown Washington. IBM provided an IBM 704 
computer, operating personnel, and analysis for orbit calculation. 29 
By Oatoher 1 1957,  Minitra-ck wa-g cnm-plete except for t_hp ~ h e ~ k ~ f i t  of 80m-p 
30 teletype links and the calibration of some stations. Three days later, Sputnik I 
began crossing the Minitrack fence every 96 minutes; but it was transmitting at 
20 and 40 M c  instead of the 108-Mc Minitrack frequency. Minitrack operators 
knew Sputnik I was passing overhead but could not track it with 108-Mc inter- 
ferometers. Actually the Russians had launched a satellite, as they had said 
they would, and were using frequencies recommended at an international planning 
meeting the year before. j1  In their preoccupation with Vanguard and Minitrack, 
American engineers had paid little attention to Russian pronouncements. 
Sputnik I was transmitting in the amateur radio bands and getting a lot of 
good publicity as hams all over the world picked up the signals. Army radio 
engineers and many amateurs spent the night of October 4 building and modify- 
ing equipment for Doppler tracking. Crude orbital data were available within a 
day. At NRL, the Minitrack team, alerted by radio announcements of the Sputnik 
launching, burned the midnight oil cutting 40-Mc dipoles and planning network 
modifications. 32 40-Mc crosses were quickly installed at Blossom Point, San 
Diego, and Lima; and later, at Santiago and Woomera. In several days, good 
tracking data was being received. Sputnik I and Sputnik II, in fact, gave Mini- 
track good shakedown runs. 
When the Explorers and Vanguards came along a few months later, Minitrack 
was completely successful, fulfilling all expectations, and surprising many who 
291BM letter to NRL, dated April 23, 1956. IBM also supported the SA0 in preparing sa te l l i t e  
ephemerides from raw tracking data.  In 1956, mathematical techniques and computer programs 
did not exist  for handling raw tracking data.  IBM donated considerable  time and talent in 
helping astronomers and mathematicians to overcome this problem, which turned out to be quite 
different from the usual astronomer’s job of computing s ta r  and planet  posit ions.  
30 John T. Mengel and Paul  Herget, “Tracking Satellites by Radio,” Sci. Amer., CXC VIII, (Jan.  
1958), 23. Mengel’s coauthor on this  paper, Pau l  Herget, was one of the astronomers who 
helped ge t  the orbit-computation problem under control. 
31CSAGI Resolutions at Barcelona - Sept. 9-14, 1955 (Working Group on Satellite Launching, 
Tracking and Computation), Recommendation C. “Establishment in all countries of radio 
observation s ta t ions for frequencies of 20 mc/sec and 40 mc/sec.”  
32The  night of Sputnik I will never be forgotten by any of the government and civil ian engineers 
and scient is ts  who rushed back to the lab to try and track that 184-lb sphere.  The  long- 
dis tance telephone ca l l s  and s e n s e  of comradeship in a common goal  w a s  perpetuated by 
scrol ls  (st i l l  hanging in some offices) dedicated to “The Royal Order of Sputnik Chasers.” 
26 
had never had anything good to  say about radio interferometry. The Minitrack 
interferometers are still the basic core of STADAN. 
Minitrack 11 
Minitrack 11 was a simplified version of the interferometer deployed at the 
prime Minitrack sites. Only four antennas were needed (two sufficed in the 
simplest design), but with the consequent loss of the ability to resolve the angle 
ambiguity mentioned earlier. A Minitrack 11 station could f ix  the time a satel- 
lite crossed its meridian with high precision by analysis of the nulls in the 
interference pattern. This information, as later proved by observations from 
the Sohio Minitrack I1 station, was sufficient to yield accurate orbital elements 
with only a single station. 33 
Minitrack 11, also called f'Jiffytrack" and 'IPoor Man's Minitrack,'I was the 
brainchild of Roger Easton at NRL. Easton even suggested that Minitrack 11 be 
installed at the prime Minitrack sites, but this was vetoed in favor of the larger, 
more sophisticated ambiguity-resolving interferometer. Still, Minitrack I1 was 
simple and "cheap" to build - something around $1,000. Perhaps amateurs 
could build it and thus supplement observations from the prime Minitrack sta- 
tions.34 In cooperation with the American Radio Relay League, NRL started 
Project Moonbeam, the electronic cousin to the SA0 amateur optical tracking 
activity, Project Moonwatch. 
A thousand dollars plus was quite a sum for most radio amateurs and only 
a few stations were actually built. 35 The major Minitrack I1 station was built by 
amateurs associated with the Standard Oil  Company of Ohio (Sohio). Sohio sup- 
plied some equipment, limited funding, and personnel to help reduce the data 
acquired. 36 The first version of the Sohio station went "on the air" at Burhan's 
home in Chagrin Falls, Ohio, on January 31, 1958, just in time for Explorer I. 
A larger installation was next built at the Sohio Research Center, in Warrens- 
ville Heights, Ohio, a suburb of Cleveland. (Figure 9) The second Sohio station 
remained in operation for about five years. Some notable firsts recorded were: 
First station in the world to pick up Explorer IV; orbii corll'ii=iiiiitiofi for E q l ~ r c r  
VII, Echo I, and Courier I; and the Doppler monitoring of the Vostok III-Vostok 
IV separation. - 
33Letter from Ralph W. Burhans, May 21, 1966. Burhans was the Project Leader of the Sohio 
Station. 
34Roger L. Easton, "Radio Tracking of the Earth Satellite," QST, - XL (July 1956), 38. 
35See  - QST, Feb. 1958, p. 60, for a station list. 




















NRL also built and installed Minitrack II equipment at Blossom Point (opera- 
tional Jan. 23, 1957) and at Cape Canaveral for tracking operations with Vanguard 
TV-0. 37 
Active Minitrack 
Sputnik I caused a major tremor in military circles. Did the Russians have 
other satellites already in orbit that did not advertise their presence via a 
tracking beacon? The specter of undetected nuclear bombs in orbit started a 
crash project aimed at detecting and tracking "dark" or "uncooperative" satel- 
lites. 
proposals were submitted that required long chains of radar-type installations. 
In contrast to these billion-dollar programs, NRL, notably Roger Easton, sug- 
gested in May 1958 using Minitrack-type interferometers in an East-West chain 
across the U.S. Several powerful transmitters along the chain would project a 
wedge-shaped "fence," so that a satellite crossing it would announce its presence 
by reflecting radio waves into the interferometers waiting below. Easton's com- 
putations showed that it would be easy to detect an object with an effective re- 
flection area one meter square at 3000 miles altitude. Furthermore the whole 
job could be done for about $3.5 million. The NRL price was three orders of 
magnitude less than other proposals. The Secretary of Defense bought the NRL 
concept. In a Horatio Alger story of military electronic tracking, Active Mini- 
track stations were quickly installed between Ft. Stewart, Georgia, and Brown 
Field, California, meeting all dollar, schedule, and performance goals. Active 
Minitrack is now called SPASUR (for Space Surveillance System) and generates 
ephemerides for each of the several pieces of space debris that cross its fence 
each minute. 
Obviously the target had to be illuminated with radio waves; several 
The impact of Active Minitrack on "passive" Minitrack was slight. The Ft. 
Stewart station was turned over to SPASUR and replaced by the Ft. Myers 
(Florida) station that received the equipment withdrawn from Havana in 1959. 
Mic rolock 
Even after Vanguard became the "official" U.S. satellite program, Army 
engineers and scientists continued to agitate for an Army satellite effort based 
on ABMA/JPL (Army Ballistic Missile Agency/Jet Propulsion Laboratory) 
technology. Participants in Project Orbiter were particularly bitter over the 
Stewart Committee selection. Realizing the weakness of the original Orbiter 
proposal in the tracking area, the J P L  Microlock phase-comparison tracking 
system was added to  the Army arsenal. 
"7See  NRL Report 4880, Dec. 3, 1956. (In NASA Vanguard files.) 
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Technically, the Microlock system consisted of (1) a phase-locked receiver, 
with implicit Doppler-tracking capabilities, (2) interferometer receivers, and 
(3) auxiliaries, such as acquisition-control, recording, and timing equipment. 
The phase-!e& arrd Doppler features were not part ef Minitrack; hut the Micrn- 
lock interferometer receivers - usually just three o r  four separate antennas 
along the baseline - were similar in function to the Minitrack antenna arrays. 
Mobility was another important characteristic of Microlock units. Most field 
units were trailer-based. 
The phase-lock feature of Microlock, in which the receiver automatically 
"locks on" to the signal phase, like radar 'Ilocks on'! to a target, had been under 
study at JPL since the early 1950's. 
was completed for the Army in September 1955 - too late for the first Orbiter 
proposal. The Army Ordnance Corps (supporting von Braun) ordered hardware 
development of Microlock. A prototype was completed in early 1956, with tests 
at Earthquake Valley, Calif., in May 1956. On September 20, 1956, the Grand 
Turk Microlock station downrange from Cape Canaveral tracked a Jupiter-C 
carrying a dummy fourth stage along a trajectory 3000 miles long and 700 miles 
high. The Army believes that it could have put a satellite into orbit on that shot. 
38 A satellite-tracking-feasibility study 
The primary Microlock station was the one at Earthquake Valley. Eventually, 
this station was moved to Goldstone Lake (site of a present DSN station). The 
mobility of Microlock made the station list a fluid one. At  one time or  another 
there were additional stations at Ibadan, Nigeria; Cape Canaveral; Singapore ; 
China Lake, Calif.; Aberdeen, Md.; and several other locations. Some of these 
stations deployed the interferometer antennas; others relied solely on Doppler 
measurements. The Sputniks and Vanguard troubles gave Project Orbiter 
another chance; and, on November 8, 1957, the Secretary of Defense announced 
that the Army would also participate in the nation's satellite program. Explor- 
ers I, 11, and IV resulted from this decision. They were tracked by Microlock 
as well as Minitrack stations. For these satellites three Microlock stations 
were employed in a network called "Spheredop." 39 
38Robert C. Tausworthe, "Theory and Practical Design of Phase-Locked Receivers," V O ~ .  l, NASA 
CR-70395, J P L  TR-32-819, Feb. 15, 1966. The key J P L  personnel on Microlock were Henry 
Richter, Eberhardt Rechtin, William Sampson, Walter Victor, and D. J affee. 
39The stations were Earthquake Valley; China Lake (Naval Ordnance Test Station); and an 
amateur station run by the San Gabriel Valley Radio Club. Other amateur Microlock stations 
were at Cedar Rapids and White Sands. The Sohio Minitrack I1 station actually adopted the 
phase-lock and Doppler features of Microlock. See Henry L. Richter, William F. Sampson, and 
R. Stevens, "Microlock: A Minimum Weight Radio Instrumentation System for a Satellite," 
Prop. (Aug., 1958), 28, 232. 
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When NASA was formed on October 1, 1958, it dismantled the Microlock 
stations. Microlock ideas, however, still survive in the space program. J P L  
phaselock techniques are central to the tracking of deep-space probes from the 
DSN. In another interesting parallel between Minitrack and Microlock, history 
finds that an Active Microlock was a l so  proposed for the tracking of dark satel- 
lites. Dr. Debeye, at the Army Ballistic Research Laboratory, Aberdeen, Md., 
was the moving force behind this approach. Though it lost to Active Minitrack, 
the Active Microlock idea became the military Doploc missile-tracking system. 
The SA0 Baker-Nunn Camera Network 
The Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory's Baker-Nunn satellite-tracking 
camera network is not officially considered part of STADAN; but, because of 
Minitrack's early confrontation with optical tracking in the pre-Vanguard days 
and the present complementary relationship of the two systems, a very brief 
recounting of the evolution of the SA0 network seems proper here. 40 
Fred L. Whipple had suggested the use of three equatorial optical tracking 
stations as part of Project Orbiter in June of 1955. Prior  to the fateful Stewart 
Committee decision against Orbiter in  late summer 1955, the National Science 
Foundation budget had already set aside $10 million for ten satellites and five 
optical tracking stations placed along the equator - a fact attesting to Whipple's 
influence and reasoning before the Long Playing Rocket Committee of the U.S. 
National Committee for the IGY. When Orbiter fell before Vanguard, Whipple 
realized that optical tracking of the much smaller Vanguard satellite would re- 
quire a camera with an extremely large aperture. In addition, he appreciated 
the satellite-acquisition problem and pushed "Project Moonwatch," a worldwide 
amateur effort that would find the satellite and provide rough times of transit 
over the local meridians. From these data, the big, new cameras could acquire 
the satellite and generate precision tracking data. In late 1955, the National 
Academy of Science and National Science Foundation, acting for the U.S. National 
Committee for the IGY, assigned optical tracking responsibility to the SAO. 
Money started flowing January 1,  1956. 
The critical piece of hardware in the SA0 program was, of course, the big 
camera. Whipple asked James G. Baker, a consultant to  Perkin-Elmer of Nor- 
walk, Conn., to  design it. By February 1956, Whipple and Baker, joined by J. 
40F0r abundant detail, s e e  Nelson E. Hayes, "The Smithsonian's Satellite-Tracking Program: ~. 
I t s  History and Organization," Part 1, Smithsonian Report for 1361, Rpt. 4482, p. 275. Part 2. 
Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institute, 1963, p. 331. 
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Allen Hynek, who had left Ohio State University to  become associate director of 
the SA0 tracking program, had laid out plans for  the new tracking camera. They 
asked Joseph Nunn of Pasadena, Calif., to do the mechanical design work. By 
fall of 1956, the Baker-Nunn camera design had prcgressec! t c  the psint where 
hardware contracts were let. Perkin-Elmer built the optical system, while 
Boller & Chivens, South Pasadena, Calif., built the camera proper. The first 
camera was tested October 2 and 3,  1957, at South Pasadena. It was decided at 
that time to dismantle the camera for minor alterations and adjustments. A few 
hours later, Sputnik I went into orbit. Sputnik I accelerated the Baker-Nunn, 
just as it did all other U.S. satellite work. The first Baker-Nunn station became 
operational at Organ Pass,  New Mexico, in November 1957, just a few weeks 
later. 
The SA0 Moonwatch program paralleled the Minitrack Moonbeam amateur 
effort. One might have expected there to be more amateur radio enthusiasts than 
astronomy enthusiasts. The Moonwatch Program, however, was well publicized 
and, under the direction of Leon Campbell, Jr., was sold all across the U.S. by 
SA0 representatives. Through the astronomical fraternity, many international 
Moonwatch stations were set up. By October 1957, there were 80 registered 
Moonwatch teams in the U.S. and 84 in foreign countries. The night of October 
4 caught Moonwatch by surprise just  as  it had the Minitrack group. Only two 
people were at the SA0 Cambridge facility when the news of Sputnik I came 
through. Others hurried back to help as they heard the news. By the dawn of 
October 5 ,  over 100 Moonwatch teams were looking for Sputnik I as it was lit 
by the morning sun for the Moonwatchers still in darkness on the Earth below. 
Unfortunately the attempts at camera acquisition of Sputnik I was as futile as the 
attempts at reception of its signals by radio hams. The Baker-Nunn cameras 
were not completed and the Minitrack frequency was wrong, 
Although no more will be said about the SA0 optical network in this mono- 
graph, its twelve worldwide stations a re  an important adjunct to STADAN, 
particularly where precision tracking data is wanted for geodetic purposes. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FOUR YEARS O F  STABILITY, 1958-1962 
The last prime IGY Minitrack station went operational at Woomera during 
October 1957. Outside of some minor shuffling and addition of sites and the re- 
building of temporary installations, no major changes were made to Minitrack 
until the big 85-ft paraboloidal antenna was installed at the new Fairbanks site 
in May 1962. This chapter covers the four years of relative stability following 
the first Explorer and Vanguard satellites. During this period; the Minitrack 
network easily tracked the few, relatively simple scientific satellites that 
passed overhead. It was a time of intense planning, research, and development 
as the Nation planned space programs that would soon saturate Minitrack's 
capabilities. It was also a period of organizational flux as  the government 
searched for the best way to prosecute a space effort that would surpass that of 
the U.S.S.R. 
NASA Is Organized 
The official U.S. IGY satellite program - Vanguard - was buried deeply 
within the country's military organization. The Army's successful Explorer 
satellites further split a satellite effort that Russian accomplishments quickly 
proved was far too weak in total. The National Aeronautics and Space Admin- 
istration was created on October 1, 1958 to remedy these deficiencies by con- 
centrating all peaceful space programs into a single organization. of this 
major realignment and upgrading of the national space program, only the fate of 
the tracking, data-acquisition, and other STADAN functions interest us here. 
Under Vanguard, tracking responsibility had been assigned to the NRL Radio 
Tracking Branch, under John T. Mengel. (Figure 10) When NASA was formed, 
the Vanguard group was transferred bodily to NASA. 42 The NRL Vanguard team 
became the nucleus of the Beltsville Center, which in May 1959 was renamed the 
Goddard Space Flight Center. In the tracking area, Mengel remained in charge 
of the Goddard work with the title of Assistant Director, Tracking and Data 
Systems, reporting to the Office of the Director of Goddard. The man, the titie, 
and the position of the tracking and data-acquisition functions remain the same 
at Goddard in 1966. 
Executive Order 10783 established NASA. A subsequent, separate agreement between NASA 
and DOD transferred the Minitrack network. See Robert Rosholt: An Administrative History of 
NASA, 1958-1963, NASA SP-4101 (1966), p. 45. 
42The cohesiveness and permanence of the Vanguard Minitrack group over a period exceeding 
ten years is remarkable. In the transfer to NASA, only a few of the original Minitrack team, 
notably Roger Easton, remained behind at NRL. 
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Figure 10. At the Project and field level (top), management of tracking and data acquisition has 
been stable for eleven years, save for the transfer of Vanguard to NASA. At the bottom, NASA 
Headquarters management of the same functions also shows long-term stability. A l l  tracking and 
data acquisition was centralizedunder the Officeof Tracking and Data Acquisition on NOV. 1,1961. 
34 
At NASA Headquarters, in Washington, where Agency-wide operations were 
to be coordinated, the tracking and data-acquisition functions were handled by 
the Assistant Administrator for Space Flight Operations in the person of Edmond 
C. Buckley, who reported to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight Pro- 
grams. (Figure 10) With some minor changes in titles, this arrangement per- 
sisted until Nov. 1 ,  1961, when an Agency-wide Office of Tracking and Data Ac- 
quisition was established. 4 3  Edmond C. Buckley assumed the title Director, 
Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition at this time; becoming, in 1966, Associate 
Administrator, Tracking and Data Acquisition. This organization has been re- 
tained through 1966. 
In comparison with industry and even other Government agencies, NASA's 
organization for managing the Minitrack and STADAN functions has been extra- 
ordinarily stable. 
When NASA absorbed Minitrack and assumed the responsibility for tracking 
non-military satellites, it also inherited the problem of finding money for oper- 
ating Minitrack and for financing the development and purchase of new equipment. 
During the Vanguard Program, money had been allocated to  the National Science 
Foundation and then passed on to the Naval Research Laboratory. In the case of 
NASA, Congress appropriates money directly. NASA Headquarters assembles 
all the monetary requirements for new facilities, research and development, 
and operation of all its networks. These requirements are related to the total 
NASA program; a budget is prepared and presented to Congress. Funds appro- 
priated for STADAN flowed originally through the Office of Space Flight Opera- 
tions to Goddard Space Flight Center, the field center with the operating re- 
sponsibility for STADAN. After the creation of the Office of Tracking and Data 
Acquisition in 1961, it has served as the source of STADAN funds within NASA. 
DOD Interfaces and Coordination 
After  its formation, NASA moved rapidly to assimilate all nonmilitary space 
activities as well as  military - -  operations it deemed important to its mission, 
particularly von Braun's organization at Huntsville and the J P L  team. With the 
acquisition of JPL, NASA had central control over all scientific satellite work 
and had absorbed the JPL Microlock stations. NASA also took over direct con- 
trol of the South American Minitrack stations from the Army in early 1959.44 
43Robert Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963, NASA SP-4101 (1766). p. 221. 
44NASA Memo 4132-8: JPC: mlk, Feb. 2, 1959. A request from NASA to the Chief, Army 
Communication Services Division, to turn over all  station responsibilities. (In NASA Vanguard 
files) 
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In the post-Sputnik era ,  DOD was rapidly building up its own tracking facili- 
ties; i.e., SPASUR. The framers  of the Space Act were concerned over duplication 
of facilities if NASA and DOD went their separate ways. Section 204 of the Space 
Act prcvided fcr a Civilian-Military Liaiscr; Ccrlrr;ittee. k1 actual practice, this 
Committee was little used and eventually atrophied completely. Significant 
duplication was actually prevented by DOD' s primary interest in detecting new, 
potentially threatening objects in space rather than acquiring scientific data from 
satellites o r  obtaining orbital elements with high precision. SPASUR and other 
DOD facilities must keep accurate traffic counts of what passes over. Today 
DOD's National Range Division and Satellite Control Facility possess some 
tracking and data-acquisition capabilities, but there has been no attempt to 
duplicate STADAN. More effective coordinating groups and Congressional at- 
tention have precluded this. In fact, NASA and DOD have shared their facilities 
to a greater and greater extent. NASA provides NORAD with tracking data and 
tracks Ai r  Force scientific satellites carrying Minitrack beacons. NASA also 
acquires telemetry data for many DOD satellites. 
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Minitrack Operation - 1958-1962 
This was a period of few major changes - one might call it a plateau - in 
Minitrack capabilities. More and more satellites were launched as NASA sci- 
entific programs began to materialize in hardware form. But the satellites 
were not large, there were not too many of them in orbit at one time, and thkir 
orbits usually were within the reach of the Minitrack net. It had.to be this way, 
obviously, because the tracking and data-acquisition network was the horse that 
had to precede the cart. A s  NASA laid plans for the Observatory series of satel- 
lites, polar satellites, and satellites circling in  highly eccentric orbits, NASA 
planners and engineers at Headquarters and Goddard had to keep one jump ahead 
with facilities that would do the required job. 
When NASA took over the Nation's scientific space programs, the IGY had 
only three months to go; Vanguard had had one success and many disappoint- 
ments; and there had been three successful Army Explorers and two failures - 
hardly a burden for Minitrack. During 1959, four more scientific satellites went 
into orbit. Some satellites, such as Vanguard I, kept on transmitting fo r  lengths 
of time that began to worry those who looked ahead in  a Malthusian way and 
feared that the sky would soon be so  full of transmitting satellites that ground 
facilities would be saturated. Cutoff or "killer" t imers  began to be installed on 
4 5  The Space Flight Ground Environment Panel of the Aeronautics & Astronautics Coordinating 
Board (AACB), with separate subpanels on Network Plans and Development effectively control 
this particular NASA-DOD interface today. 
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satellites to counter this trend. But by 1960, most recognized that Minitrack, 
despite its great victory over the nay-sayers of 1955-1956, would have to be en- 
hanced in several ways within two o r  three years. This preparation and deploy- 
ment of today’s STADAN is the subject of the next chapter. 
Network Modifications and Chawes 
Some Minitrack site changes were  made during the 1958-1962 period to im- 
prove geographical coverage and data acquisition. Stations were added at College, 
East Grand Forks, St. John’s, and Winkfield. A few stations were closed down 
or shifted; for example, the move of the Havana equipment to Ft. Myers, and the 
shutdown of Antigua. These changes did not add any radically new capabilities 
to Minitrack. 
Some changes in telemetry and command antennas were made during this 
period, and supporting electronic equipment was improved. The ”rockinghorse” 
antenna of Vanguard days was superceded by a manually pointed 9-Yagi array 
(Figure 11) and then by a few 16-Yagi arrays to improve telemetry reception 
and command transmission. The fundamental frequency of Minitrack was upped 
from 108 Mc to 136-to-137 Mc in 1960 to escape from local interference at the 
lower frequency and meet International Telecommunication Union (ITU) require- 
ments. This change required relatively minor modification of the Minitrack 
interferometer. Unfortunately, complete frequency conversion was impossible 
between 1961 and 1965 because several active satellites were still telemetering 
useful data at 108 Mc. 
Another rather interesting change to Minitrack involved the modification of 
the calibrating astrographic cameras for optical satellite tracking in May 1960. 
The resulting cameras did not have the precision and acuity of the SA0 Baker- 
Nunns, but the larger satellites could be tracked and, in addition, used for Mini- 
track calibration in the place of aircraft. Collectively, the new cameras formed 
the Minitrack Optical Tracking System (MOTS). 46 
Summarizing this short chapter: In the first four years after NASA’s cre- 
ation in October 1958, Minitrack changed but little. There was no larger need 
- yet - satellites were few, far  between, and relatively simple. Major changes 
were in the offing, however. 
46David W. Harris, et al, “MOTS - The Minitrack Optical Tracking System,” Photo. Sci. Eng., 
VI1 (March 1963), 73. 
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Figure 11.  A 9-Yagi, 136-Mc STADAN antenna. 
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CHAPTER V 
METAMORPHOSIS OF MINITRACK INTO STADAN 
The preceding chapter hinted at major changes brewing beneath the calm 
surface of the 1959-1962 time period. To understand how and why Minitrack 
evolved into STADAN, let us first look at the pressures NASA's satellite plans 
exerted on its tracking and data-acquisition facilities. The total picture can be 
best visualized with the help of a cause-and-effect table: 
-Cause- 
Pressure Due to Planned Program 
Tracking requirements of polar- 
orbit satellites and geodetic 
satellites. 
Data- acquisition requirements 
of Ob servatory-clas s satellites 
and communications and meteor- 
ological satellite programs 
Tracking requirements of 
synchronous satellites and 
those in highly eccentric 
orbits . 
Need for better command 
capability for complex 
Observatory-class satellites 
and large meteorological 
satellites. 
-Effect- 
Major Additions to Basic Minitrack 
Extension of geographical coverage 
to Alaska. See Appendix A for 
details. 
Installation of 85-ft and 40-ft para- 
bolodial antennas at Gilmore, 
Orroral Valley, and Rosman. 4 7  In- 
stallation of SATAN telemetry an- 
tennas. 48 Addition of high capacity 
data links to Goddard. 
Goddard Range and Range Rate 
tracking systems installed at sev- 
eral  STADAN sites and on mobile 
equipment. 
SATAN command antennas with 
high-powered transmitters. 
The picture of Minitrack changing into STADAN evokes the question of how 
the whole thing was planned, How did NASA's tracking people' know what kind of 
47  An antenna is only an obvious external feature. A great deal of new electronic gear supports 
each new antenna. 
48 SATAN = Satellite Automatic-Tracking Antenna. 
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antennas to  develop and where to  place them? Formal long-range plans laying 
down tracking and data-acquisition requirements were rari t ies during the early 
days of the U.S. space program. Paperwork was at a minimum. The already- 
toid story d the birth of Minitrack showed iiii step-by-step p h x .  I~s tead  
engineers, such as John Mengel and Roger Easton, sitting down over a cup of 
coffee, looked at the Vanguard satellite, figured out how big a transmitter they 
could afford and how much money they had, and then decided how many Minitrack 
stations to put where. A s  plans and funding changed, Minitrack changed-all 
with a minimum of paperwork. 
With the advent of NASA, funding levels jumped from millions to billions, 
and the sheer magnitude of the Nation's space effort demanded a more rigorous 
approach. If tracking and data-acquisition equipment was to be developed and in- 
stalled in time for a new satellite program, a forecast of satellite launchings 
had to be available. NASA's first formulation of a comprehensive plan was em- 
bodied in a secret  document entitled !'NASA Long Range Plan," prepared in 
December 1959 by the Office of Program Planning and Evaluation. 4 9  This plan 
was primarily a forecast of what NASA could do given certain budgetary constraints 
and reasonable extrapolations of the state of the art in launch vehicles-the pac- 
ing facet of space technology at that time. Plans such as this were continually 
modified, particularly under the pressure of the Soviet feats in space. Despite 
their ephemeral character, these plans gave tracking engineers targets to shoot 
at, such as the planned Observatory-class satellites and synchronous communica- 
tions satellites. To meet such requirements, Goddard engineers had to predict 
the state of the art two o r  three years in advance. Various technical solutions 
were studied and tried out in the laboratory. Finally specific approaches were 
selected and developed into operational hardware, such as the Goddard Range and 
Range Rate equipment. 
In STADAN, as in most other technical enterprises, there has been no pre- 
dictable, cut-and-dried engineering response to  administrative plans. Someone 
with foresight gets a n  idea, develops it, and sells it up the administrative chain 
of command. Really significant ideas, such as the DAF, backed by good sales- 
manship frequently changed plans and budgets in their favor. 
In the paragraphs that follow, some of the key technical and historical fea- 
tures of these additions will be related. Separating out and listing the major 
49Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963, NASA SP-4101 (19661, 
p. 130. 
"Perhaps the sharpest perturbation occurred on May 25, 1961, when President Kennedy an- 
nounced that i t  was time for a "great new American enterprise" - landing a man on the 
Moon in the decade of the s ixt ies .  
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additions t o  the basic Minitrack, we have: 





The new 85-ft and 40-ft dishes 
The Goddard Range and Range Rate tracking equipment (RARR) 
SATAN telemetry antennas and SATAN command antennas 
Enlargement and automation of the ground-based communication links 
between STADAN stations. 
All  these changes and additions have converted Minitrack into what is now called 
STADAN (Space Tracking and Data-Acquisition Network.) ’ 
Station Site Changes 
The early Minitrack sites were geographically constrained by the short 
range of the tiny Vanguard transmitter and the lack of precision tracking during 
the satellite injection phase downrange. No one was sure jus t  where a satellite 
would pop over the horizon. Minitrack stations were thus deployed, rather close- 
spaced, along the now-familiar detection fence on the 75th meridian. Today, 
with downrange tracking ships and much better injection tracking, rough orbital 
elements a re  available even before the satellite leaves the vicinity of the launch 
range. Spacecraft, too, are more sophisticated and can carry beacons that send 
out strong signals. The Minitrack “detection-fence” approach has been abandoned 
in favor of fewer better-equipped stations located all over the world. The table 
in Appendix B confirms this trend. First, though, there was the elimination of 
redundant Minitrack sites, such as  Antofagasta. These changes were offset by 
the addition of new Minitrack sites well outside the 75th-meridian fence, e.g., 
Winkfield and College. In 1966 a few Minitrack sites were being phased out al- 
together; examples a re  Blossom Point and East Grand Forks. Some, such as 
College, were being consolidated with other STADAN stations. The fact of today 
is that tracking is not the most important function of STADAN, a s  it was with 
iviinitrack; data acquisition has assumed prime importance. STADAN is no longer 
characterized by an interferometer fence but instead by well-separated, high- 
data-rate paraboloidal antennas. 
A s  the list of sites (Appendix B) with 40-ft and 85-ft antennas indicates, 
every continent except mainland Eurasia possesses such a site. (Actually the 
‘Frequently, the word “Space” in STADAN’S acronym has been changed to “Satellite,” but 
this unnecessarily limits STADAN’s utility with semantics. STADAN has been used for lunar 
purposes; viz., the Anchored IMP’s (IMP’s D and E). 
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Alaska STADAN station can be thought of as an Eurasian outpost.) This distri- 
bution is necessary because today's satellites run the gamut in inclination from 
the equatorial Syncom to the Polar Orbiting Geophysical Observatories. Or- 
specific reason for placing a station away from the 75th meridian. The first 
Australian station at  Woomera, for example, was placed there for geodetic pur- 
poses during the IGY. The new Australian STADAN station in Ororral Valley, 
however, possesses an 85-ft dish and conforms with STADAN consolidation 
philosophy that data acquisition is STADAN's prime reason for being. 
:,-:--11-- n n  +hn cl+n+inn w'n-nn4-t c in Annnnrliv d t o c t i f x r  thprp pyist.pd a more iguias iy  , a u  LUC~ u W L ~ ~ ~ ~  2,,,, &, LrrvaA-LL A Ivy , ___ - _ _ _ _ _ _  . - 
To summarize then, the geographic evolution of STADAN has consisted of 
three overlapping phases: 
0 The Minitrack 75th-meridian fence 
0 Geographically dispersed Minitrack stations 
0 Fewer, better-instrumented, well-dispersed STADAN stations. 
The Bin Dishes 
The first 85-ft antenna went into operation at the Alaska STADAN station in  
March 1962. 
Nimbus meteorological satellite program, which officially began at NASA in 
1960. Minitrack data-acquisition capabilities were obviously inadequate for re-  
ceiving the flood of cloud-cover pictures that Nimbus would generate. One or  
more wide-band, high-data-rate antennas were required. A large, pointable 
antenna (Figure 12) is an expensive affair-roughly $910,000 for the design, 
engineering, fabrication and erection of the Alaska 85-ft dish. John Mengel re- 
calls that, in 1961, Dr. T. Keith Glennan, then Administrator of NASA, said 
never to ask him again for any more such equipment. 5 3  The 85-ft dishes have 
obviously been well worth their price; NASA now owns four of them and operates 
a fifth which belongs to ESSA. (See Appendix B) 
The main stimulus behind its design and construction was the 
Since the equipment at the STADAN sites is described in great technical de- 
tail in readily available NASA documents, only events of historical interest a re  
covered in this chapter. 5 4  
52Sites  with 85-ft dishes were originally termed DAF (Data-Acquisition Facility) s i t e s ,  but are 
531nterview with John T. Mengel, April 28, 1966. 
54 The m o s t  descriptive reports are: Satellite Instrumentation Network Faci l i t ies  Report, Goddad 
Rpt. X-530-62-3, April 1962 (note the early acronym-SIN); Satellite Tracking and Data Ac- 
isition Network Facilit ies Report (STADAN), Goddard X-539-64-159, June 1964; and s ace 
Zacking and Data Acquisition Network Facilit ies Report (STADAN), Goddard X-530-6* 
December 1965. 
now part of STADAN. 
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Figure 12. Photograph of the first Roman 85-ft Data Acquisition Faci l i ty  Antenna 
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The price of the first Rosman 85-ft antenna was brought down to $760,000, 
less  for additional ones,but NASA decided to  install cheaper 40-ft paraboloids at 
sites where smaller antennas were adequate. (Figure 13) The first of these new 
antennas went into operation at Quito in December 1963. 
STADAN seemed by 1966 to have reached an instrumentation plateau, just as 
Minitrack did at the end of the ICY. Data-acquisition facilities were then ade- 
quate for the satellite programs planned by NASA. Indeed, satellite science was 
being caught in a budget squeeze by the higher-priority Apollo program. Further- 
more, there seemed to be a trend away from complex, high-data-rate Observa- 
tory-class satellites to larger numbers of smaller scientific satellites. The 
recent creation of the SSS (Small Standard Satellite) program illustrated this 
trend. According to John Mengel, the next task for STADAN would be one of 
automation, wherein antennas and associated electronic equipment are automat- 
ically pointed and switched over to the desired satellites as they appear over the 
horizon. There is a growing traffic problem in  space that causes station opera- 
tors  considerable trouble as they quickly t ry  to switch from one satellite to 
another, each with different frequencies and priorities. 
Goddard Range and Range Rate Equipment (RARR) 
Although STADAN's primary mission has become data acquisition, the 
tracking function is no less vital than it was in the Vanguard days. Tracking, in 
fact, has become a great deal more difficult as NASA's programs have expanded 
to embrace Syncom, IMP, and EGO. The problems are two: 
0 In synchronous o r  stationary orbits the satellite being tracked moves very 
slowly - perhaps not at all - with respect to  the ground-based track- 
ing station. Minitrack interferometry is powerless here because it 
cannot generate a precision orbit without many separate observations 
at well-separated spots. Minitrack yields only direction cosines and 
not the range and range rate directly, yet these are critical parameters 
in jockeying a synchronous satellite into orbit. 
0 Minitrack angle tracking is of little use when satellites a r e  near apogee 
in an eccentric orbit. In this region, angles vary slowly but range and 
range rate change quickly. 
These tracking problems were recognized by NASA before 1960, when the 
essentials of RARR were laid out by Edmund J. Habib, at Goddard, and Eli 
Baghdady, of Adcom, Inc. 5 5  In essence, FWRR sends a signal to the spacecraft, 
5 5 E d m ~ n d  J .  Habib, George C. Kronmillet, Peter D. Engels, and Henry J .  Franks, Deyi.oy;et 
of a Range and Range Rate Spacecraft Tracking System, NASA TN D-2093, June 19 
three coauthors of Habib were part of the original Goddard RARR design team. )  
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which replies through a transponder. In a process called "sidetone ranging," 
time of signal transit to and from the satellite yields distance and Doppler 
measurements give range rate. 
Space Technology Laboratories built the first piece of RARR equipment for 
the NASA Syncom program in 1961. Motorola, GE, and General Dynamics/Elec- 
tronics have since constructed additional units. The table in Appendix B indi- 
cates when and where RARR units have been deployed in STADAN. 
SATAN Equipment 
The early evolution of the "rockinghorse'l and Yagi telemetry antennas was 
described in Chapter ID. The installation of the big 85-ft and 40-ft wideband, 
data-acquisition paraboloids did not diminish the need for better telemetry an- 
tennas to  handle the smaller satellites. The big dishes can be used for  the 
smaller Explorer-class satellites, but it is a waste of their capability if  an 
Observatory, a Nimbus, or some other large satellite is also within station 
range. The purpose of the SATAN antennas is to complement the data-acquisi- 
tion and command functions of the big dishes, replacing the small, often hand- 
pointed, 9- and 16-element Yagis of Minitrack vintage. The SATAN antennas 
also perform as  acquisition aids for  the narrow-beam-width paraboloids. At  
sites with no big dishes, the SATAN antennas will of course be the prime data- 
acquisition and command antennas. 
There a r e  two types of SATAN antennas: one for telemetry reception and 
another for  command-the down-link and upl ink ,  according to current term- 
inology. (Figures 14 and 15)56 Although the early Yagi antennas did not have 
automatic tracking capability, all recent versions do. Automatic tracking is, of 
course, inherent in the name of the antenna. SATAN telemetry-reception an- 
tennas operate in the 136-to-138 Mc range, and the command antennas transmit 
in the 123-Mc and 147-to-150-Mc bands. 
Inhouse development of the SATAN antennas began at Goddard soon after 
the Center was created. By 1960, a developmental model tower and pedestal, 
servodrive system, and 108-Mc receiving-antenna a r ray  were installed at 
Blossom Point. Based on this development work, NASA held a competition for 
SATAN production. On August 17, 1962, NASA selected Dalmo-Victor Company 
and Amelco, Inc., to negotiate for R&D and production services for  the SATAN 
program. The history of SATAN antenna deployment is summarized in Appendix 
56Goddard Space Flight Center: Data Systems Development plan, Satellite Automatic-Tracking 
Antenna Network (SATAN), Revision 2, Sept. 23, 1965. 
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Figure 14. Photograph of a SATAN Telemetry Reception Antenna 
47 
1 
Figure 15. Photograph of a SATAN Command Antenna 
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B. By the end of 1966, 18 SATAN telemetry and 16 SATAN command antennas 
were installed at STADAN sites. 
STADAN Communications 
A worldwide tracking and data-acquisition network is of little avail unless 
there is a corresponding communication system tying the stations to the control 
and data-processing center. Not only must the millions of data words recorded 
from several dozen satellites each day be transmitted back to waiting computers, 
but instructions must be sent from the central control point to individual sta- 
tions for  relay to the proper satellites. Goddard Space Flight Center, the con- 
trol point for STADAN, may wish, for example, to change data-acquisition 
priorities for the satellites passing over Santiago. 
In the Vanguard days, teletype circuits were the main method of communi- 
cation between Minitrack stations and the Vanguard Control Center. (Figure 8) 
With just a few primitive satellites, teletype circuits could handle most of the 
data. A modern OGO, however, may spew out a few full-length books of data at 
each pass over a station. With a few dozen active satellites in orbit, each 
making a circuit of the globe in about two hours and filling up its tape-recorder 
memory each trip, ordinary teletype circuits could not handle the load. For 
most satellite data, reels of tape (some 40+ miles of tape per day) plus the in- 
ternational postal system form the logical communication link. High priority 
data, "real-timefT data, satellite commands, and satellite status data can be sent 
by teletype where necessary. Voice communication between field stations and 
the NASA control centers was added for  Project Mercury. 
5 7  
All NASA tracking, data-acquisition, and command stations including all 
three major networks (STADAN, DSN, and MSFN), are linked together by 
NASCOM, a far-flung integrated grid of landlines, undersea cables, and radio 
links (Figure 16). An integral part of NASCOM is SCAMA (Switching, Confer- 
encing, and Monitoring Arrangement), which handles all voice communications. 
Continuing with the acronyms: NETCON stands for Network Control, where 
STADAIU' operational scheduling is originated; OPSCON equais Operations Con- 
trol  Center. 
5 8  
NASCOM has been built up link by link over NASA's entire history. It would 
detract too much from the overall STADAN story to recount all the additions and 
changes over the last eight years. Two "snapshots," (Figures 8 and 16, show the 
network at two well-separated points in time. 
5 7 T h e  early Minitrack stations, particularly those in South America, used to contact one another 
v ia  amateur radio to discuss  mutual problems and pass  the time away between infrequent 
satellite passes .  
"R. H. Bidlack, "The 304 Conference Switching System," Bell  Laboratories Record, XLIII, 






The twelve-year history of NASA satellite tracking, stretching from the con- 








The insight of the NRL group into the importance of satellite electronic 
tracking helped them win the official U.S. program over Orbiter in 1955. 
Two buildups and two plateaus characterize Minitrack/STADAN history. 
(Figure 17)  
The requirements of synchronous and high-eccentricity satellites 
made it necessary to  supplement interferometer tracking with RARR 
tracking during the early 1960's. 
The primary mission of STADAN changed from tracking to data ac- 
quisition in the mid-1960's. The 85-ft and 40-ft dishes and SATAN 
antennas were added to cope with this increased requirement. 
Since 1963, there has been a trend toward fewer but better-instrumented 
stations. 
The total worth of STADAN facilities in 1966 is approximately twenty- 
five times that at the end of the IGY in 1958 (See Appendix C). 
NASA centralized its management of tracking and data acquisition early 
in its history and these functions have always reported well up in the 






























































Through the ages, communications have been the prologue to discovery. 
Whether by feeble smoke signals or high speed electronic signals, communica- 
tions have been essential in the exploration of new frontiers. Today, these 
frontiers reach beyond our own planet. In fact, man’s electronic signals are 
already preceding him to the Moon and to other planets. Already, although the 
Space Age is in its infancy,man has made remarkable strides in penetrating the 
atmosphere surrounding his planet-and even ventured into space. Scores of 
made-on-Earth objects have been launched into space, many to roam the solar 
system forever. We stand now on the threshold of a new era of discovery. 5 9  
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O F  MINITRACK AND STADAN STATIONS 
ALASKA 
Synonyms: Officially called Ulaska (for University of Alaska) before 1961. Also 
called Fairbanks, a more general appelation, which includes the Gilmore and 
College sites. 
Location: Gilmore Creek, 13 miles north of the city of Fairbanks, Alaska. An 
old placer mining site. The Gilmore site is only 3000 f t  away. Alaska was the 
first DAF site, with an 85-ft antenna becoming operational in March 1962. The 
high-gain, multiple-frequency antenna was required for the polar-orbiting 
Nimbus satellites, the POGO'S, and the EGO'S. A 40-ft antenna was added in 
August 1966. In late 1966, the Minitrack array at College was moved to Alaska 
to  consolidate Alaskan tracking operations. The site is on NASA-owned land. 
ANTIGUA 
Location: Antigua is a small island (108 square miles) in the British West 
Indies. Tracking facilities were at Coolidge Field, where the U.S. conducted 
military operations. 
Antigua was one of the original Minitrack sites installed during the IGY. Inter- 
ferometer arrays were installed to  track Vanguard launch vehicles approaching 
and leaving along the Atlantic Missile Range. The site was operated jointly by 
the U.S. Navy and Ai r  Force. A Microlock station with interferometry and 
Uoppler tracking was ais0 instaiied 011 Aiitig-ua. The site was doscd  in July 1951. 
ANTOFAGASTA 
Location: A Pacific port in north Chile. The tracking station was located at a 
spot called Salar del Carmen. 
Antofagasta was one of the original, prime Minitrack IGY sites set up along the 
75th meridian. On Chilean soil, the station was initially operated by the Army 
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and then by a joint NASA-Bendix-University of Chile team. With the improved 
capabilities at Santiago and Quito, Antofagasta became redundant and was 
closed in July 1963. 
BARBUDA 
Location: A small island in the Leeward group southeast of Puerto Rico; once 
important in the slave trade. 
Barbuda was suggested as a Minitrack site in the early NRL reports and 
proposals; (see NRL Memo 548). Because of difficult terrain (logistics) 
Antigua and Grand Turk were chosen instead as downrange Minitrack 
sites. 
BLOSSOM POINT 
Location: At  Blossom Point, Maryland, on the Potomac River, 40 miles south 
of Washington, D.C. 
Blossom Point was the first operational Minitrack station. It was ready at the 
time of the first Sputnik, in early October 1957. In fact, a special 40-Mc cross  
array was quickly installed at Blossom Point to track the Sputniks. Blossom 
Point has been called the "prototype" Minitrack station and has been used for 
much research, development, and equipment testing. The Minitrack c rews  were 
trained there during the IGY days. On a site leased from the Army, Blossom 
Point was first operated by Navy personnel and then taken over by a Bendix 
crew. Blossom Point was closed in the fall of 1966 and its equipment was trans- 
ferred to Network Test and Training Facility (NTTF) at Goddard Space Flight 
C enter . 
CANAL ZONE 
Location: Canal Zone. 
A Canal Zone Minitrack station was proposed by NRL in the Vanguard proposal. 
Sites in Panama proper were also examined (see Panama); but because of 
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, 
electronic interference and poor sites, no tracking stations were built either in 
Panama or  the Canal Zone. 
CARNARVON 
Location: In northwestern Australia. 
Carnarvon is the site of a Goddard Range and Range Rate tracking unit. At 
present, there is no other STADAN equipment installed. A MSFN station is also 
located at Carnarvon. 
COLLEGE 
Synonyms: Also called Fairbanks, a more general appelation that includes 
Gilmore and Alaska sites. 
Location: A state-owned site six miles north of the city of Fairbanks. College 
was added to the original IGY Minitrack network in 1960 when it became neces- 
sary to track high-inclination satellites, such a s  Nimbus and POGO. The station 
has been operated by personnel from the University of Alaska. In late 1966 the 
Minitrack equipment was transferred to the Alaska site. 
EAST GRAND FORKS 
Location: 14 miles northeast of East Grand Forks, in northwestern Minnesota. 
The East Grand Forks Minitrack station was added to the original Minitrack 
network in 1960 to track high-inciination Satellites. The eqQxxczt. xzz8 02 B 
leased private site and was operated by Bendix personnel. This station was 
phased out in the fall of 1966 as part of NASA's program relying on fewer,  better- 
instrumented tracking stations. 
FT. MYERS 
Location: 7 miles south of F't. Myers, on the Gulf Coast of Florida. 
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The Ft. Myers Minitrack site was added in 1959 to replace the Ft. Stewart sta- 
tion that was  converted to an Active Minitrack (SPASUR) station for Air  Force 
use. Ft. Myers received most of its equipment from the Havana station when 
it was removed after the Cuban revolution. The site is on leased private l a d  
and is operated by Bendix personnel. 
FT. STEWART 
Location: Georgia 
Ft. Stewart was the site of one of the original IGY Minitrack arrays. In 1958, 
the site was modified for use by the A i r  Force in the East-West Active Mini- 
track fence (SPASUR). The passive Minitrack equipment was transferred to 
Saint Johns, Newfoundland, in 1959. 
GILMORE 
Synonyms: Often called Fairbanks in the literature and sometimes Alaska (in 
error).  The name I t  Fairbanks" actually includes all Alaskan STADAN facilities. 
Location: See discussion under Alaska. 
Gilmore is the site of a second Alaskan 85-ft antenna, which was built in 1962 
for  the U.S. Weather Bureau (now part of ESSA). The Gilmore antenna is now 
used extensively by ESSA in the Tiros Operational Satellite (TOS) program. 
Eventually ESSA will probably assume complete responsibility for operating 
this facility. 
GRAND TURK 
Location: A small island southwest of Florida in the Bahamas group. 
Special Minitrack equipment was installed on Grand Turk during the ICY to 
track the Vanguard third stage. The equipment consisted of an array of Yagi 
antennas looking downrange. Grand Turk was phased out in 1961 as  other 
tracking equipment on the Atlantic Miss i le  Range took over during the ascent 
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phase of satellite launches. A Microlock station was also installed on Grand 
Turk and tracked military vehicles as  early as 1956. 
HAVANA 
Location: At Batista Field, 32 miles west of Havana. 
One of the IGY prime Minitrack stations was installed at Havana in 1957. An- 
ticipating harassment and interference after the Cuban revolution, NASA moved 
the station's equipment to Ft. Myers in 1959. 
JOHANNESBURG 
Synonyms: Esselen Park, Pretoria, Hartebeesthoek, and Olifantsfontein have 
all been used to designate NASA tracking facilities in the Johannesburg area. 
The reasons for this confusion a re  evident in the following discussion. 
Location All STADAN equipment is now located at Hartebeesthoek thirty-eight 
miles northwest of Johannesburg. 
Minitrack equipment was installed at Johannesburg during the IGY to pick up 
satellites a s  they were placed in orbit along the Atlantic Missile Range. At 
first the equipment was placed at Esselen Park, 18 miles northeast of Johannes- 
burg, where it was operated by the National Telecommunications Research Cen- 
ter ,  temporarily located at the National Railway College. When the Minitrack 
equipment was converted to 136 Mc in 1960, the site was moved to Hartebeest- 
hoek. The original Esselen Park site was close (4 miles) to the Olifantsfontein 
site of the one of the SA0 Baker-Nunn cameras. Hartebeesthoek is also the 
location of DSN equipment. 
........................................................................ 
U N O  
Location: Kano is a city in northern Nigeria. 
ISIS telemetry and command equipment is installed at Kano to get better geo- 
graphic coverage during this ionospheric research program. A MSFN station 
is located here. 
61 
KAUAI 
Location: Kauai is one of the Hawaiian Islands. 
ISIS telemetry and command equipment is installed at Kauai to get better geo- 
graphical coverage during the ionospheric research program. A MSFN station 
is located here. 
LIMA 
Location: The Minitrack station is at Pampa de Ancon, 20 miles northwest of 
Lima, Peru. 
Lima was the site of one of the prime IGY Minitrack installations along the 
75th meridian. Originally run by the Army, the equipment is now run by a team 
made up of NASA, Bendix, and scientists from the Geophysical Institute of Peru. 
Lima was one of the sites where special antennas were installed to track the 
Sputniks, which transmitted at 20 and 40 Mc instead of the 108-Mc Minitrack 
design frequency. 
M AYAGUANA 
Location: A n  island in the Bahamas group. 
Originally Mayaguana was slated to receive a modified Minitrack station to track 
the Vanguard third stage, but since the Antigua and Grand Turk sites seemed 
adequate, the station was eliminated from the network in September 1957. The 
equipment that was destined for Mayaguana was sent to San Diego. 
MOJAVE 
Synonyms: The Mojave STADAN site is often referred to a s  Goldstone o r  
Barstow in the literature. 
Location: The nearest important town is Barstow, California, 50 miles south- 
west. The site is in the Goldstone Lake area in the Mojave Desert near NASA's 
DSIF installation. 
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Barstow was not one of the original, prime Minitrack IGY sites. It did not 
become operational until 1960, when the Minitrack equipment originally in- 
stalled at Brown Field Naval Auxiliary Air Station at Chula Vista, California, 
was transferred out to the Goldstone area in the electronic quiet of the desert. 
A 40-ft antenna has since been installed. Mojave is on NASA land and is 
operated by Bendix personnel. 
ORRORAL VALLEY 
Synonyms: Sometimes called Canberra. 
Location: 35 miles southwest of Canberra, Australia. 
The Orroral Valley site was added to STADAN in 1965, when an 85-ft DAF dish 
was placed in operation. Like the other Australian tracking installations, 
Orroral Valley permits more frequent telemetry readout of satellites and also 
helps determine the precise shape of the Earth with geodetic measurements 
from the South Pacific. Minitrack equipment from the Woomera site was 
moved to Orroral Valley in late 1966. 
PANAMA 
Location: At Rio Hata, Panama. 
The Panama site was to have been one of the prime Minitrack stations along the 
7 5th meridian during the IGY. The Panama government wished the site located 
at a military base, where there would have been serious electronic interference. 
This fact, combined with frequent thunderstorms, reduced the desirability of a 
site in Panama. When it became apparent that the Antigua and San Diego sta- 
tions would suffice for tracking and data acquisition during satellite passes over 
this region, the Panama station was abandoned. The Minitrack equipment was 
sent to Woomera, Australia. 
QUITO 
Location: At Mt. Cotopaxi, near Quito, Ecuador. 
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Quito was one of the prime IGY Minitrack stations along the 75th meridian. The 
station is on a leased private site. Originally set up and run by U.S. Army per- 
sonnel, it is now operated by Bendix. In addition to the Minitrack interferometer, 
there is now a 40-ft dish installed. 
ROSMAN 
Location: Near Rosman, North Carolina, about 30 miles southwest of Asheville. 
Rosman is one of the newer STADAN stations. The first 85-ft DAF dish went 
into operation in July 1962, the second in August 1964. The site was established 
specifically for receiving high-data-rate telemetry from Observatory-class 
satellites. Rosman also has Range and Range Rate equipment and is an ATS 
site, but there is no Minitrack interferometer. 
SAN DIEGO 
Location: Station was located at the Brown Field Naval Auxiliary Air  Station, 
Chula Vista,  California. 
The prototype Minitrack equipment manufactured by Bendix was installed at San 
Diego in 1957. Navy Electronics Laboratory personnel operated the station for 
NRL. The imminent closure of Brown Field stimulated the move of the station 
to Mojave in 1960. San Diego also received modifications that permitted recep- 
tion of the Sputnik 20 and 40-Mc signals in late 1957. 
SANTIAGO 
Location: Station is located at the Peldehune Military Reservation, 52 miles 
northeast of Santiago, Chile. 
Santiago was one of the prime Minitrack sites established along the 75th meridian 
during the IGY. It has been enlarged considerably with the addition of a 40-ft 
dish, Range and Range Rate equipment, and, in 1957, modifications to permit the 
tracking of Sputnik 20- and 40-Mc signals. The station is on Chilean land. The 
U.S. Army originally operated the station, but the operating team is now made 
up of NASA, Bendix, and University of Chile personnel. 
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ST. JOHN'S 
Location: The station site is 14 miles north of St. John's, Newfoundland. 
This Minitrack station was added to the network in 1960. The station, on 
Canadian land, is operated by Canadian personnel. 
TANANARIVE 
Location: 18 miles west of the city of Tananarive, in central Madagascar (now 
the Malagasy Republic). 
The recent addition to STADAN increases tracking and data-acquisition coverage 
in the southern hemisphere. Range and Range Rate equipment was installed in 
1965. In 1966, SATAN Minitrack equipment, and a40-ft antenna were added. 
TOOWOOMBA 
Location: About 80 miles west of Brisbane. Transportable ATS equipment is 
installed here. 
WINKFIE LD 
Location: At Winkfield, 20 miles southwest of London. 
Winkfield is a Minitrack station established in 1961. It is the only European 
STADAN station. The equipment is located on a British site and operated by 
British personnel. 1 
WOOMERA 
Location: The U.S. tracking facilities a re  located about 8 miles southeast of the 
Australian town of Pimba, in Southern Australia. The major Australian rocket 
facilities at Woomera a re  northwest of the U.S. facilities. 
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The Woomera station was installed during the IGY to get tracking data from the 
southern hemisphere for geodetic purposes. The Minitrack equipment originally 
intended fo r  Panama went to Woomera. The site is owned by Australia and the 
operators a re  all Australian. In late 1966, the P;lifit,tra& equipment was moved 
to Orroral Valley. The Woomera site received modifications in 1957 so that the 
Sputnik 20- and 40-Mc signals could be received. Woomera also has a DSN 
station and an SA0 Baker-Nunn camera station. 
MOBILE STATIONS 
There a re  a number of portable pieces of STADAN equipment that a r e  moved to 
various spots for  various programs; viz., portable telemetry and command 
equipment at Darwin, Australia, for the OGO program, and the shipboard Range 
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Alaska site, 39, 42, 57, 67 
Amateur programs, see Moonbeam, Moonwatch 
American Rocket Society, 10, 13 
Antigua site, 20, 25, 37, 57, 58, 62, 63, 67 
Antofagasta site, 19, 20, 25,41, 57, 67 
Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA), 12, 29 
Army Map Service, 19, 22, 24, 25 
Army Project Vanguard Task Force, 19, 24 
Azusa, 9 
Baghady, Eli, 44 
Baker, James G., 31 
Baker-Nunn camera, 2, 3, 24, 31-32 
Barbuda site, 18, 20, 58 
Barstow site, 62 
Bendix Corp., 22 
Berg, Capt. Winifred, 19 
Blossom Point site, 19, 22, 25, 26, 28,41, 46, 58, 67 
Buckley, Edmond C., 34, 35 
Burhans, Ralph W., 27, 28 
Carnarvon site, 59, 67 
College site, 37, 41, 57, 59, 67 
Communications, in Minitrack, 24-25 in STADAN, 49 
Crooks, James W., Jr., 7,  9 
Cuba site, see Havana site 
DAF sites, 42 
Data acquisition, history, 6 
in Minitrack, 24-25 
in STADAN, 46-47 
Deep Space Net (DSN), 1, 49 
DOD, Committee on Special Capabilities, 13 
interfaces with NASA, 1-3, 35-36 
networks, 1-3, 36 
(See also Army, Navy, etc.) 
Doppler tracking, 5, 7 , 14, 18, 26 
in Microlock, 30 
in Minitrack, 18 
69 
Doppler tracking (cont'd.) 
in Minitrack 11, 27 
in STADAN, 46 
East Grand Forks site, 37, 41, 59, 67 
Easton, Roger, 13, 14, 27, 29, 33, 40  
Eisenhower, Dwight, 1 2  
ESRO, 1, 2 , 3  
ESSA, 42, 60 
Esselen Park site, 2, 6 1  
Explorer I, 17, 27, 30 
Fairbanks site, 57, 59 
Ft. Myers site, 29, 37, 59-60, 67 
Ft. Stewart site, 19, 25, 29, 60, 67 
Gilmore site, 57, 60, 67 
Glennan, T. Keith, 4 2  
Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), formation, 33 
NTTF, 58, 67 
responsibilities in STADAN, 1, 34, 35, 49, 58 
Goldstone site, 62 
Grand Turk site, 20, 25, 58, 60, 62, 67 
Habib, Edmund J., 44 
Hagen, John, 34 
Hartebeesthock site, 6 1  
Havana site, 18, 19, 20, 25, 29, 37, 61, 67 
Herget, Paul, 26 
Hoover, George, 12 
Huancayo site, 18 
Hynek, J .  Allen, 32 
IMP satellites, 42, 44 
Inter-American Geodetic Survey (IAGS), 19 
Interferometer, see radio interferometer 
International Geophysical Year (IGY), 1, 6, 10, 12, 13, 19, 31, 36, 68 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 20, 37 
Jacksonville site, 18 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), 12, 17, 29, 30, 31, 35 
Johannesburg site, 6 ,  67 
70 
Kano site, 61 
Kauai site, 62 
Kennedy, John F., 40 
Lima site, 19, 25, 26, 62, 67 
Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN), 1, 49, 59, 61, 62 
Mark I1 Minitrack, see Minitrack I1 
Mayaguana site, 20, 62 
Mengel, John, 13, 14, 16, 26, 33,40, 42, 44 
Microlock, 17, 29-31, 35, 57, 61 
Minitrack, ambiguity problem, 21, 27 
antennas, 22, 23, 37, 38, 67 
calibration, 24, 37 
communications , 24-25 
development and deployment, 17-32 
equipment list, 67 
evolution into STADAN, 2,  5, 39-44 
frequency selection, 20, 37 
modifications, 37, 39-44 
negotiations with foreign countries, 19, 20 
operations, 36-37 
origin, 10, 13, 14, 16, 1 7  
si te descriptions, 57-66 
site list, 67 
site selection, 19 
site map, see foldout map 
station requirements, 18 
timing standards, 24 
transfer to NASA, 33-34 
Minitrack Optical Tracking System (MOTS), 37 
Minitrack 11, 17, 27-29, 30 
iviobiie stiaiioiiij, BG 
Mojave site, 62, 67 
Moonbeam Project, 27, 32 
Moonwatch Project, 27, 31 
NASA, DOD interfaces, 1, 2, 3, 35-36 
Headquarters, 1, 33, 34, 35 
planning, 40 
NASCOM, 49, 50 
National Academy of Sciences, 31 
National Science Foundation, 10, 31, 35 
71 
Naval Electronics Laboratory, 20, 64 
Naval Research Laboratory, in Active Minitrack, 29 
in Minitrack 11, 27 
ONR relationship, 12  
in Project Vanguard, 13-15, 17, 33, 35 
in Viking work, 9-11 
NETCON, 49 
Network Test and Training Facility (NTTF), 58 
Nimbus, 42, 57 
NORAD, 3,36 
Nunn, Joseph, 32 
Observatory satellites, 39, 42, 44, 46, 57, 64, 66 
Office of Naval Research (ONR), 12, 17 
Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition, 34, 35 
OGO, see Observatory satellites 
Olifantsfontein site, 61 
OPSCON, 49 
Optical tracking, 2, 17, 24 
competition with radio tracking, 24, 31 
early history, 5-6 
Orbiter Project, 12, 13, 16, 27, 29, 30, 31 
Panama site, 19, 58, 63, 66 
Peenemkde tracking, 7 
Pretoria site, 61 
Quito Site, 18, 19, 25,44, 63-64, 67 
Radar, 7, 29 
Radio interferometer, 2, 7 
competition with optical tracking, 24, 31 
early history, 9-11 
principle, 8 
in Vanguard proposal, 13-15 
Range and Range Rate System (RARR), 18, 39, 40, 41, 44-45, 67 
Rechtin, Eberhardt, 12, 30 
Richter, Henry, 12, 30 
Rosen, Milton, 9, 10, 13, 14 
Rosman site, 39, 43,44, 64, 67 
Sampson, William, 12, 30 
San Diego site, 19, 25, 26, 62, 63, 64, 67 
72 
SATAN equipment, 39, 41,46-49, 67 
Santiago site, 18, 19, 25, 26, 64, 67 
SCAMA, 49 
Seddon, J. Carl, 10 
Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (SAO), 17, 24, 26, 31, 31, 61, 66 
Sohio station, 27, 28, 30 
SPASUR, 1, 2, 3, 29, 36 
Sputnik I, 26, 29, 32 
STADAN, acronym definition, 1 
antennas, 33, 38, 39,42,43, 45,46-49 
communications, 49-50 
financial summary, 68 
frequencies, 46 
functions defined, 1, 5, 51 
interfaces with other networks, 1, 2, 3, 32 
management, 33, 34, 51 
mobile stations, 66 
requirements, 34 
station descriptions, 57-67 
station map, see foldout map 
Stewart, Homer J., 13 
Stewart Committee, 13, 14, 17 ,  29, 31 
St. Johns site, 37, 65, 67 
Syncom, 42,44, 66 
Tananarive site, 65, 67 
Tiros, 60 
Tocopilla site, 18 
Toowoomba site, 65 
Tousey, Richard, 14 
Ulaska site, 57 
university of Alaska, 57, 59 -- 
Van Allen, James A., 10 
Vanguard Project, 9,33, 34, 35, 36 
budget, 68 
NRL proposal, 13-16 
Vanguard I, 21, 36 
Viking Project, 6, 9-11, 14, 15 
von Braun, Wernher, 12 ,  14, 35 
V-2 tracking, 6, 7, 8, 9 
73 
Washington s i te ,  18 
Wbipple, Fred L., 6 ,  10, 12, 14, 31 
White Sands, 6 ,  9,  14, 18, 21 
Widdield site, 37,4i, 65, 67 
Woomerasite,  20, 22, 25, 26, 3 3 , 4 2 ,  63, 65-66, 67 
40-foot dishes, 41, 42, 4 4 , 4 5  
locations, 67, foldout map 
85-foot dishes, 3 3 , 4 1 ,  4 2 , 4 3 ,  44 
locations, 67, foldout map 
74 
